

CURRENT *History*

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COMMUNIST CHINA, 1965

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OR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

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CURRENT History

SEPTEMBER, 1965

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This seven-article analysis points up the progress being made in Communist China and the problems facing China's aging leaders. Our introductory article emphasizes the fact that "Although the advanced ages of the top Chinese Communist leaders make them one of the world's oldest ruling groups, they are also remarkable for their continuity in power over the years. . . ." Still, as this specialist points out, "Mao's departure from the scene will inevitably introduce new tensions into the leadership. . . ."

Leadership and Succession in Communist China

By WILLIAM F. DORRILL

Staff Member, Social Science Department, The RAND Corporation

HAVING WEATHERED seven turbulent years of economic crisis and deepening estrangement from the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist leadership currently displays a mood of renewed self-confidence and restrained optimism. This outlook contrasts sharply with both the manic assurance of the Great Leap Forward in 1957-1959 and the depressive uncertainty that accompanied its disastrous collapse in 1960-1961. However, the asceticism, caution and pragmatism that characterized the domestic scene during the more recent years of "readjustment and consolidation" are still very much in evidence.*

Peking's present mood has been shaped by

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the view of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

at least two major considerations: its evaluation of past achievements and its assessment of future tasks. The "first generation" Communist leaders are intensely proud of their accomplishments. After decades of political fragmentation, internecine warfare and national impotence extending back through Nationalist, Warlord, and Manchu regimes, China has a strong, uncorrupted central government. Despite the imposition of Draconian totalitarian controls, it has realized its age-old dream of evicting all foreign imperialist influence. While demanding heavy personal and material sacrifices of the populace, it has given new hope to some formerly submerged social groups and, on balance, has made considerable progress toward modernization and industrialization.

The failure of the Great Leap Forward (still not explicitly admitted) and the con-

comitant withdrawal of Soviet amity and assistance shocked and tested the mettle of the Chinese Communist leadership. As late as 1962, it had to contend with severe food shortages, widespread popular apathy and disaffection, an armed minority revolt in Sinkiang, and threatened isolation within the Communist world. Though still haunted by the unsolved problems of chronic poverty and secular stagnation, the regime now appears to have stimulated the economy. Premier Chou En-lai was able to tell the National People's Congress in December, 1964, that preparations would soon be under way to launch a third Five Year Plan in 1966—some three years behind schedule.¹

In addition to the renewed hopes for economic advance, other developments have buoyed Peking's self-confidence. Successive nuclear detonations have dramatically attested China's previously underrated scientific and technological capabilities. Although it may require a decade to achieve the status of a militarily significant nuclear power, China has already derived immense psychological and political advantages from becoming the first non-Western member of the nuclear club. Having accomplished this feat in good time despite the withdrawal of Soviet assistance, Peking's leaders probably feel that their difficult and, at times, painful policy of self-reliance has been more than vindicated. Meanwhile, the downfall of Nikita S. Khrushchev in the U.S.S.R. almost cer-

tainly reinforced their belief in the correctness of the militant ideological position of Mao Tse-tung and the inevitability of its ultimate triumph.

While these domestic and international gains have given the Chinese leaders cause for satisfaction, if not rejoicing, they seem for the most part unable or unwilling to abandon the sober, somber demeanor of more difficult times. Since this incongruity does not appear to rise from a devaluation of their past achievements or present performance, perhaps it may best be explained in terms of a preoccupation with anticipated future problems. Besides disquieting international uncertainties on the immediate scene (e.g., the war in Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet dispute), the Malthusian spectre of geometric population increases outstripping food supplies hangs over the distant horizon.²

TWOFOLD SUCCESSION PROBLEM

Present evidence suggests that perhaps the single overriding concern of the aging leadership in Peking is the twofold problem of succession. On the one hand, preparation must be made for an individual or group to replace Mao Tse-tung following the inevitable event of his death or retirement. In addition, a whole new generation of leaders must be recruited and trained to succeed the present "first generation" rulers.

Although public discussion of Mao's replacement is inhibited by the obvious delicacy of the subject, it is possible to infer Peking's wider concern in numerous frank statements on the "cultivation of successors." As the *People's Daily* editorial put the matter:

It is the leadership nucleus that determines the direction of advance of the revolutionary cause. Whether the nucleus of leadership at all levels of our Party and state is composed of genuine proletarian revolutionaries or not is a decisive matter for the success or failure of our entire revolutionary cause.³

Viewing the future in terms of a protracted and bitter struggle between socialism and capitalism, the Peking regime—as acute economic pressures have eased—has laid increasing stress on the maintenance of political purity and ideological control. There are

¹ Chou's announcement came in the course of his wide-ranging "Report on the Work of the Government" delivered on December 21–22, 1964, at the First Session of the Third National People's Congress. See *Peking Review*, No. 1, January 1, 1965, p. 10.

² In January, 1964, Chou En-lai told the American journalist, Edgar Snow, that China's rate of population increase had risen to 2.5 per cent. With unofficial population estimates (which, unfortunately, are virtually unverifiable) now running between 700 and 750 million people, this may mean that as many as 17 million persons are added to the population each year. At this rate the total population could reach 1 billion by 1980. Meanwhile, despite relatively good harvests in recent years, domestic grain production remains inadequate to feed the existing population. A text of Snow's interview with Chou En-lai appeared in the *Washington Post* on February 3, 1964.

³ "Cultivating and Training Millions of Successors to the Proletarian Revolution," *Jen-min jih-pao*, August 3, 1964.

good reasons for this, given its radically revolutionary vision and goals.

Mao and his lieutenants, sensitive to the lessons of history, are mindful of the eroding effects of time on other revolutionary movements. In particular, they are genuinely disturbed at what they consider the corruption and degeneration of Soviet society, which they believe threatens to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R.⁴

At the same time they are painfully aware of—and may tend to exaggerate—China's inherent weaknesses and limitations for the task of establishing a revolutionary socialist society. Despite 15 years of frenzied Communist assaults on Chinese society and culture, vast sections of the peasant and urban masses still cling stubbornly to a host of deep-rooted traditional loyalties and practices. During the famine-threatened "three hard years" of 1959–1961, when Peking in desperation resorted to private incentives and greater personal freedom to spur production, the leadership was evidently shocked at the resulting widespread "spontaneous tendency towards

capitalism" and loss of "socialist consciousness" among the people.⁵ Previously, in 1957, it had received a similar jolt when, in a mood of overweening self-confidence, it invited the intellectual community to "boldly criticize" its defects in the spirit of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend."⁶ Mao and his battle-scarred senior cadres now tend to see "bourgeois remnants" or "class enemies" under almost every bed, threatening if unchecked to corrupt the masses and undo the revolution.

THE POLITICAL BACKDROP

Peking's response to the problem of "fostering revolutionary heirs" is best understood when viewed against the background of internal political developments over the last few years. During the difficult period of retreat from the Leap Forward, the Communist leadership undertook a series of political purification and control measures in an attempt to reassert Party authority, dispel cadre apathy and disillusionment, and combat Soviet-inspired "revisionist" tendencies.

In January, 1961, the Ninth Plenum of the C.C.P. (Chinese Communist Party) Central Committee, while ushering in an economic program remarkably akin to the Soviet N.E.P. (New Economic Policy) of the 1920's,⁷ called for a major rectification campaign. Designed to help cadres raise their political consciousness and improve their style and method of work, as well as to purge the impure elements alleged to have infiltrated Party and government organs, the campaign was to proceed "stage by stage and area by area" throughout the nation.⁸ Meanwhile, Minister of Defense Lin Piao unleashed a series of rectification movements in the army to cope with sagging morale and disorder.⁹ The tenth plenary session of the C.C.P. Central Committee in 1962 resolved "to strengthen at all levels the work of the Party Control Commissions" (constitutionally charged with supervising discipline) and to elect additional members to the Central Control Commission.¹⁰

In the spring of 1963, the Party and armed forces having presumably been purified, the

⁴ For a polemical but probably sincere Chinese analysis, see *On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World*: ninth comment by the editorial departments of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964).

⁵ Acute concern over these trends was manifested in the communiqué published after the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Tenth Plenum in September, 1962. See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, September 29, 1962.

⁶ Vivid examples of the consequent "blooming and contending" may be found in Roderick Macquarrie, *"The Hundred Flowers" Campaign and the Chinese Intellectual* (New York: Praeger, 1960), and Dennis J. Dooley, *Communist China: The Politics of Student Opposition* (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1964).

⁷ On the striking similarities, see Franz Schurmann, "China's 'New Economic Policy'—Transition or Beginning," *The China Quarterly*, No. 17 January–March, 1964), pp. 65–91.

⁸ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, January 21, 1961, p. 1.

⁹ Issues of a secret military journal, *Kung-tso tung-hsün* (Bulletin of Activities), made available by the U.S. State Department in 1963, document these rectification campaigns and the conditions within the armed forces which gave rise to them. For an analysis see John W. Lewis, "China's Secret Military Papers: 'Continuities' and 'Revelations,'" *The China Quarterly*, No. 18 (April–June, 1964), p. 68–78.

¹⁰ Tenth Plenum Communiqué, *op. cit.*

regime focused attention on the general population.¹¹ Early in 1964, the tempo of indoctrination was again stepped up as the regime evinced growing concern over the persisting gap between Party authority ("redness") and professional management ("expertness"), previously regarded as a temporary evil dictated by the economic crisis. A massive "socialist education" campaign was undertaken. Soon afterward, a parallel movement was launched to "learn from the People's Liberation Army."¹²

Increasingly, the P.L.A. has been viewed not only as the highest model for political and ideological emulation, but as the best example of mass organizational and production techniques. As a result, in the spring of 1964 an extremely significant program was begun to create P.L.A.-style political departments in all industrial, commercial, and financial organs of the government from the national ministries down to enterprises at the local level. Corresponding departments for economic affairs have been established in the Party apparatus from the Central Committee down to the local Party committees. This arrangement gives the C.C.P. a larger measure of direct involvement in vital sectors of the economy and, besides offering new opportunities to stimulate and regulate production, provides an institutional framework to sustain a high level of political indoctrination.

Present indications are that the campaigns for "socialist education" and "learning from the P.L.A." are continuing, albeit with

periods of slackening or upsurge in activities. In February, 1965, the *People's Daily* reported that the "socialist education" drive was under "vigorous development in rural and urban areas" and Finance Minister L. Hsien-nien urged commercial workers to take an active part in it, struggling resolutely "against the comeback of capitalism."¹³ In June, the *People's Daily* advised: "The nationwide effort to emulate the P.L.A. has become a mass campaign for revolutionizing various trades and services."¹⁴ In July, T'ao Chu, Deputy Premier and First Secretary of the Party's Central-South Bureau, announced that the "socialist education" movement would soon be extended to many new districts in his important five-province domain, viewing this as a prelude to a "second revolutionary soaring leap" in production.¹⁵

The recent mass campaigns, though often employing language reminiscent of the heady Leap Forward period, have exhibited important differences in practice. While promising to "carry the revolution through to the end," they have shown a chastened sensitivity to the ambivalent relationship between politics and production. The Communist leaders undoubtedly hope for a steady rise in production to get the third Five-Year Plan off to a good start in 1966, but their economic programs are unlikely to be either as ambitious or as poorly managed as in 1958.

Another difference may be observed in the more practical political goals of today's mass movements. Although greatly improved communications (e.g., an expanding network of wired broadcast systems serves 95 per cent of China's cities and rural districts)¹⁶ now assure Peking an immense captive audience, the leadership has not slanted its political and ideological efforts primarily toward immediate conversion of the general population to socialism. Rather, the main emphasis seems to be on the cadre level and on the preparation of a disciplined populace which will be responsive to cadre leadership.

In the interest of creating a responsive popular environment, "socialist education" has exhorted the masses to cultivate personal habits of hard work and frugality and to

¹¹ During 1963, there was also a series of mass movements primarily designed to improve production, better economic management, and advance technology—but inevitably also bearing a political message.

¹² See Ralph L. Powell, "Commissars in the Economy: 'Learn from the PLA' Movement in China," *Asian Survey*, V, No. 3 (March, 1965), pp. 125-138.

¹³ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, February 16, 1965, pp. 1, 2.

¹⁴ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 8, 1965, p. 1.

¹⁵ Quoted in *The New York Times*, July 6, 1965, p. 3.

¹⁶ U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Far East), No. 230, November 25, 1964, p. ccc-3. The effectiveness of this network was eloquently attested by one peasant who reportedly exclaimed: "As soon as I hear loudspeakers crackling, my mind is clarified!" *The New York Times*, December 4, 1964.

"study the thought of Mao Tse-tung." Meanwhile, the P.L.A. emulation drive has served to instruct and guide cadres in their leadership role. Its emphasis has been on the mastery of techniques developed in the armed forces for conducting political and ideological work, particularly the P.L.A.'s "three-eight" work style (i.e., hard work, plain living, flexible tactics, unity, vigor, seriousness and liveliness) and "four firsts" (i.e., man over material things, ideological work over routine tasks, political work over other types, and integrated practice and theory over bookishness).¹⁷

CULTIVATING THE NEW GENERATION

In mid-1964, as a result of mounting concern among Peking's aging leaders, efforts to deal with the problems of transferring power to a new generation were accorded the highest priority. For a long time, top Party leaders had feared that the younger generation, untested in war and unstepped by the hardships of the Long March or the Yen-an caves, would fail to appreciate fully the accomplishments of the revolution—or even be lured away from the correct but arduous path of struggle by the corrupting influences of capitalism and "revisionism." Predictably, the *eminentes grises* had been stung in December, 1963, by a widely circulated speech of Roger Hilsman, then United States Assistant Secretary of State, which alluded to a "more sophisticated second echelon of leadership" in Communist China and suggested that evolutionary developments could "eventually profoundly erode the present simple view with which the leadership regards the world."¹⁸

¹⁷ For explanations of these and other major slogans by the editorial department of the *People's Liberation Army Daily*, see *Current Background*, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 732 (May, 1964), pp. 38-43.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1280, January 6, 1964, pp. 13-14.

¹⁹ Article by "Observer," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, February 19, 1964, p. 1.

²⁰ For a detailed analysis of an attack on a politically deviant intellectual see "Yang Hsien-chen: Unity or Division," *China News Analysis*, No. 535, October 2, 1964; also John W. Lewis, "Revolutionary Struggle and the Second Generation in Communist China," *The China Quarterly*, No. 21 (January-March, 1965), pp. 136-145.

After some time the *People's Daily* replied: This amounts to a public declaration by U.S. imperialism of its intention to promote "peaceful evolution" in China, to subvert its people's regime and to restore capitalism.¹⁹

When the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League convened in Peking in June, 1964, five of the nation's highest leaders were in attendance: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Successive speakers warned that "modern revisionism" and capitalism threatened to engulf the younger generation and called for new measures to "win over youth." On August 3, a front-page editorial in *People's Daily* presented perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative statement to date on the whole problem of the cultivation of successors. It declared that the latter must be carefully selected on the basis of class origin and political attitudes and then tempered through periodic rectification campaigns and class struggles. Five criteria were established for those worthy of being successors: they must be "genuine Marxist-Leninists"; true revolutionaries; "proletarian political leaders capable of rallying and working with the overwhelming majority"; they must be exemplary practitioners of the Party's system of democratic centralism; and must be "humble and prudent," possessed of the spirit of self-criticism.

To ensure a favorable environment for cultivating revolutionary heirs and to silence any false prophets who might lead them astray, the Party hierarchy in subsequent months launched a series of limited but severe attacks against politically deviant intellectuals and academics—the most notable heresy hunt since 1958.²⁰

At the beginning of 1965, the scope of these attacks was broadened to include an unspecified number of middle school and college teachers of political theory who were accused of harboring "revisionist" views and, horror of horrors, "distorting and obliterating" the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

Looking toward the future, there is every likelihood that campaigns of varying scope and intensity will occur at intervals to assist

the present ruling élite in the cultivation of a worthy successor generation. There is the considerable danger, of course, that in severely penalizing dissent, the regime will rear a sterile and uncreative stock, incompetent to deal with the tremendous problems ahead.

FINDING MAO'S SUCCESSOR

Although preparations against Mao's inevitable death or retirement are not publicly discussed as part of the generational succession problem, there is no reason to doubt that this is a central concern of the top leadership. Mao is now 71 years old. While officially portrayed as vigorous and alert, the state of his physical health and mental acuity have been in question for some time. Recurrent rumors of a stroke (one in May of 1965) have been denied and Mao has kept to a fairly heavy schedule of public appearances, interviews and at least symbolic participation in meetings. In January, he twice remarked to Edgar Snow that he was "getting ready to see God very soon," but one of his physicians assured Snow, on another occasion, that Mao had no organic troubles and suffered only the fatigue normal for his age.²¹ Other recent foreign visitors have noticed Mao's dependence on an attendant in moving about, his slight difficulty in coordinating gestures, and "a bad case of smoker's cough."²² Except for brief, cliché-laced denunciations of the United States, Mao's formerly impressive literary production has been virtually nil in recent years.

Regardless of the extent to which age and infirmity have reduced Mao's direct exercise of power, he continues to enjoy a position of unique, unprecedented and pervasive authority in China. He is regarded as the supreme arbiter, not only in politics, but in all areas of life. He is considered the guardian-genius of the revolution, the symbol and conscience

of the "New China," and the source of popular inspiration and power in the building of socialism. Since 1959, when he relinquished the chairmanship of the People's Republic to Liu Shao-ch'i (but retained the more important post of C.C.P. chairman), Mao has been the object of a growing campaign of adulation which now approaches the Stalinist "cult of personality" in its intensity and hyperbole. To be sure, his birthdays go uncelebrated, streets are not named after him, and he has not taken advantage of his position to engage in widespread purges of political opponents.

However, he is venerated as a Communist immortal—on the same plane with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin—and his thought is proclaimed as a guide to the solution of virtually all human problems. Soldiers, labor heroes, and even ping-pong champions almost invariably attribute their successes to the study of Mao's tactics and ideology (especially its ethical precepts). While he may live on indefinitely in teachings and legend, the removal of his direct inspiration and authority from the Peking regime will probably increase the possibilities of internal division and dilution of the revolutionary militancy.

The problem of succession to Mao is rendered more acute by the similar advancing age and declining vigor of most of the inner circle of Peking's top officials. Within the Politburo, the Party's highest ruling organ, most members are well into their 60's or 70's.²³ Of the 19 full members elected at the last (Eighth) C.C.P. Congress, three have died (Lin Po-ch'ü in 1960, Lo Jung-huan in 1963, and K'o Ch'ing-shih in 1965) and several others probably are unable to play an active role because of age or illness. Ironically, the youngest, Minister of Defense Lin Piao (age 57), apparently has been forced to reduce his activities sharply in recent years because of a chronic illness, possibly tuberculosis.

Although the advanced ages of the top Chinese Communist leaders make them one of the world's oldest ruling groups, they are also remarkable for their continuity in power over the years and their maintenance of an almost unbroken united front despite the

²¹ Edgar Snow, "Interview with Mao," *New Republic*, February 27, 1965, pp. 17, 23.

²² See *The New York Times*, May 31, 1965.

²³ For a detailed, though somewhat dated, analysis of the age problem in the central leadership, see Donald W. Klein, "The 'Next Generation' of Chinese Communist Leaders," *The China Quarterly*, No. 12 (October-December, 1962), pp. 57-60.

vicissitudes of the internal and external situation. For over 30 years, this small, seemingly tight-knit circle has led the burgeoning Chinese Communist movement. Seldom in history have so few led so many for so long. While we know little of the inner workings of the ruling élite, its longevity and apparent continuity would suggest the perfection of a rather unique operational style. Its long, relatively unblemished record lends support to the much publicized claim of exercising a genuine "collective leadership"—though undoubtedly also a highly personalized one.

Mao's departure from the scene will inevitably introduce new tensions into the leadership and may accentuate present sub-surface differences. While there is no hard evidence of existing factionalism among the top leaders—in the sense of competing, disciplined groups—it would seem unlikely that lively disagreements, opposing viewpoints, persistent dissent and, perhaps, even personal animosities have been totally avoided. Despite the close ties forged over the years since their epic Long March, it would seem incredible that the Chinese leaders all now think exactly alike on policy issues or possess the perfect virtue required to accept all adverse decisions without enmity or reservation.

It is possible to infer even from our limited evidence that sharp debates have arisen in recent years over the ill-advised and ultimately

disastrous Leap Forward policies²⁴ and possibly also over the decision to sever historic and valuable ties with the U.S.S.R. The dismissal of former Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai and other high military officials in 1959 and the political eclipse of economic planner Ch'en Yün (both members of the Politburo) suggest serious unresolved disagreements.²⁵ In his December, 1964, report to the National People's Congress, Chou En-lai, while claiming regime support from over 95 per cent of the population, warned that subversive elements continued to creep into Party and governmental organs, seeking to cultivate protectors and agents even in the higher echelons of the leadership.

The removal of Mao's restraining influence and power to arbitrate may allow future differences or dissent within the leadership to broaden into overt factionalism, significantly affecting the cohesion and stability of the regime. However, we can only speculate on this possibility. Overt preparations for the succession to Mao may be traced back to the first session of the C.C.P.'s Eighth National Congress in 1956. At that time, the post of honorary chairman of the Central Committee was created, presumably in anticipation of Mao's eventual retirement from active participation in Party affairs. Two years later, Mao announced his decision not to seek reelection to the chairmanship of the People's Republic, thereby opening the way for a transfer of power by installments to his faithful lieutenant and heir apparent, Liu Shao-ch'i.

Though the C.C.P. constitution makes no

(Continued on page 179)

²⁴ For interesting, though perhaps overstated, analyses of possible factionalism arising out of the Leap Forward debates see Harold C. Hinton, "Intra-Party Politics and Economic Policy in Communist China," *World Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (July, 1960), pp. 509-524; and Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (December, 1958), pp. 323-335.

²⁵ See David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal Peng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly*, No. 8 (October-December, 1961), pp. 63-76. In addition to P'eng, other prominent leaders have been removed from important military, governmental, and Party posts since 1959. These include: Huang Z'o-ch'eng, P.I.A. Chief of Staff under P'eng and P'an Cheng, long time head of the P.I.A.'s General Political Department—both men also dropped from the Party Secretariat; Chang Wen-t'ien, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs (possibly feared to be too friendly to the U.S.S.R.); Hsi Chung-hsün, former Vice-Premier and Secretary General of the State Council; and most recently, Li Wei-han, former director of the C.C.P. Central Committee's United Front Work Department and Vice-chairman of the N.P.C.

William F. Dorrill served from 1961 to 1963 in the United States government as a foreign affairs analyst. He pursued graduate studies in political science and East Asian affairs at the University of Virginia, the Australian National University, and Harvard University; subsequently, from 1959 to 1961, he did field research in Taiwan and Hong Kong under a Ford Foundation grant.

Pointing out that "there is a widespread feeling that Communist China's scientific and technical ability and potential have been underestimated," this specialist concludes nonetheless that "until Peking can produce some form of credible nuclear deterrent of her own, it is logical to assume that she will not adopt policies that actually involve very high risks. . . ."

Communist China as a Military Power

By RALPH L. POWELL

Professor of Far Eastern Studies, School of International Service, American University

THE MILITARY POLICY of any state is actually part of its overall foreign policy and is based on national objectives. Hence, before analyzing the military policy and capabilities of a state, its basic national and foreign policy aims should be considered.

The leaders of Communist China—the "Chinese People's Republic" (C.P.R.)—are both Communists and nationalists. It is apparent from their statements and actions that they are influenced by both ideology and nationalism. Most specialists would agree that they have several basic objectives.

First, they hope China will become a great political and military power, with a Communist political and economic system. Second, they hope to dominate the Asian continent, as the Chinese Empire in periods of great strength tended to dominate Asia. However, the achievement of this goal would

require a basic withdrawal of the power and commitments of the United States in the Far East.

Third, the Chinese Communists obviously seek the leadership of the world Communist movement, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. But this objective can be achieved only at the expense of the Soviet Union.

Fourth, the Chinese leaders claim to be the true champions of revolutionaries throughout the world and maintain that they "never conceal" the fact that they "wholeheartedly support every people's revolutionary war."¹ Yet the support of revolutions in the less developed areas can only be carried out at the expense of the existing governments.

The Soviet Union, which is well informed but admittedly biased on the subject, has recently referred to Communist China's foreign policy objectives as "hegemonic, nationalistic and great-power aims" that seek the "export of revolution" by means of war."² Fortunately, in recent years, Peking's foreign policy actions have usually been somewhat more cautious than her vitriolic propaganda would indicate. For example, she has avoided a direct and irreversible confrontation with the military might of the United States. The aging Chinese Communist leaders are militant revolutionaries, but they are not unusually irrational. Still, the ambitions and military potential of the C.P.R.

¹ "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace," *Peking Review*, No. 47 (November 22, 1963), p. 11.

² B. N. Ponomarev (Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.), editor, *The International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class*, cited by New China News Agency (English), Moscow, February 28, 1965, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (S.C.M.P.), American Consulate General (Hong Kong), No. 3410, p. 33. For a comparatively restrained official Chinese Communist statement of national objectives and foreign policy views—in Marxist-Leninist terms—see "Premier Chou En-lai Reports on the Work of the Government," *Peking Review*, No. 1 (January 1, 1965), pp. 6-20.

are such that they provide a threat to China's neighbors and to the peace of the world.

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

To support the military and security aspects of their basic objectives, the Chinese Communist leaders maintain the largest conventional armed forces in the world, and they are placing the highest priority on the development of a nuclear capability. During the past year, there have also been important developments in the fields of personnel strength, militia activities, conventional military equipment and, most vital of all, the development of atomic weapons. As a result, foreign specialists have tended to increase their estimates of the military capabilities and potential of the Chinese armed forces, which are collectively called the "People's Liberation Army." (P.L.A.)

Communist China is so secretive and so security-conscious that there is insufficient data available to present a detailed, accurate picture of the size and equipment of its armed forces. But it is possible to present a general description that is probably fairly accurate.

The P.L.A. is a massive, unified force consisting of ground, air and naval services. The large public security forces are separately administered but, like the other services, they are "under the direct guidance of the Military Affairs Committee" of the Communist party.³ Official Chinese military documents indicated that in late 1960 the P.L.A. had a strength of about 2.7 million.⁴ The army is still the dominant service and contains

most of the manpower. In peacetime, the largest tactical unit is the *chün* (army), which is actually comparable to our corps, although the latter has greater fire power and strategic mobility. The army is still primarily an infantry organization, but it is much more modernized and complex than it was during the Korean War. There are artillery and cavalry, as well as several armored divisions. Airborne units exist, but they are seriously handicapped by the shortages of airlift capacity. In Tibet, there are mountain divisions that are reported to be acclimated and well equipped.⁵ The army is adequately equipped with standardized light and medium infantry and artillery weapons. There are also a considerable number of obsolescent Soviet tanks. Still, there are serious shortages of heavy and complex equipment, most of the available stocks having been supplied by the Soviet Union prior to 1960.

P.L.A. SETBACKS

The collapse of the drastic economic program known as the "great leap" and the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 were extremely heavy blows to the P.L.A., especially to the air force. In 1960, the Chinese air force was the third most powerful in the world. By 1964, it had seriously deteriorated and was rapidly becoming obsolete. Prior to most recent developments, the air force was believed to have a strength of about 90,000 men. Estimates of its aircraft varied considerably, from 2,300 to 2,900. Fighter strength was assessed at from 1,600 to 1,900 planes. Most of these were obsolete Soviet MIG 15 and MIG 17 jets. There were assumed to be less than 100 MIG 19's, plus 300-400 subsonic IL 28 light jet bombers. A drastic shortage of fuel and spare parts existed. Some planes had been cannibalized to keep others airborne.⁶

The navy is the weakest of the armed services. It has some coastal defense value, but its amphibious capability is "primitive." The principal threat consists of a substantial fleet of submarines, which the commander of the United States Seventh Fleet has been

³ "Bravely Advance Under the Great Red Banner of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung," *Nan-fang Jih-pao*, February 3, 1965, in S.C.M.P., No. 3406, p. 10.

⁴ *Kung-tso T'ung-hsün* (Bulletin of Activities), No. 1, January 1, 1961.

⁵ *The Military Balance, 1964-65* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 9; Samuel B. Griffith, II, "Communist China's Capacity to Make War," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1965, p. 223.

⁶ *The Military Balance, 1964-65*, p. 10; Griffith, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-226; Chalmers Johnson, "How Sharp Are the Chinese Dragon's Claws?" *The New York Times* (International Edition), March 31, 1965; Ralph L. Powell, "Communist China's Military Potential," *Current History*, September, 1964, pp. 138 and 141.

quoted as saying could "constitute a potentially dangerous force."⁷

THE MILITIA

In the latter half of 1964, and in 1965, the Chinese leaders have made strenuous efforts to increase their military strength. One aspect of this has been the strengthening of the militia, which serves as a very large reserve force for the regular armed services. During the "great leap" in 1958, Mao Tse-tung ordered the mobilization of the masses into a universal militia under the slogan, "Everyone a Soldier." This attempt to regiment almost the total adult population for labor and military service was a dismal failure.

For this reason, since 1961, the Party has gradually sought to rebuild the militia on a more realistic basis, with emphasis on the "basic" as opposed to the larger "ordinary" units. However, principal emphasis has still been placed on political indoctrination and economic production. In most cases, military training has taken third place.⁸

Owing in large part to the serious situation in Vietnam, militia activities have been increased since the summer of 1964. In November, instructions were issued to implement a directive from Mao Tse-tung calling for the

militia to be put on a sound footing, politically, organizationally and militarily. As in the past, emphasis was placed again on political control and loyalty, while socialist education was said to be the "central task." The militia were still to be a "shock force in production," yet efforts were also being made to strengthen combat readiness.

During 1965, militia contests involving military skills have been carried out in a number of provinces. These are closely related to a massive program of militarized sports events. Together, these have included such activities as military drills, marksmanship, bayonet practice, gliding, parachute jumping, navigation and mine laying. However, the time devoted to these activities is still too limited to provide the "ordinary" militia with more than a rudimentary knowledge of military skills. Furthermore, emphasis is still being placed on the "basic" or "backbone" units and weapons are restricted to politically reliable "workers and poorer peasants."⁹

The size of the militia is unknown, the frequently cited figures of 10 or 20 million being "round numbers." Actually, only the "basic" units, consisting primarily of ex-service men from the P.L.A., political activists and party members, can really be considered to be military organizations. Still, even these militiamen must number in the millions. They are capable of providing the P.L.A. with a very large number of politically reliable and militarily trained reserves. The larger "ordinary" militia constitutes a secondary reserve, with a minimum of military training. Yet, under the Maoist concept of a "people's war" they could serve as harassing agents or semi-trained guerrillas, in the unlikely event that China was invaded.

The militia is not the only field in which the Communist regime is seeking to strengthen its military posture. In January, 1965, the length of conscript military service was extended; it is now four years in the infantry, five years in the specialized arms of the ground forces, in the air force and in the shore-based units of the navy, and six years in the fleet units.¹⁰ It is believed that

⁷ *Hong Kong Standard*, April 1, 1965; see also "Rival Sea Power in the Pacific," *South China Morning Post*, April 23, 1965.

⁸ See Ralph L. Powell, "Everyone a Soldier," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1960, pp. 100-111 and, by the same author, "Communist China's Mass Militia," *Current Scene*, Vol. III, Nos. 7 and 8 (November 15 and December 1, 1964). Cf. also Walter D. Jacobs, "Militia in the Commune Era," *Revue Militaire Generale*, March, 1962, pp. 311-324.

⁹ In late 1964 and in 1965, there have been numerous articles regarding the militia in the Chinese Communist press, and on radio. See, especially, "Militia Political Work Conference Called in Peking by P.L.A. General Political Department," New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.) Peking, November 16, 1964, in S.C.M.P. No. 3340, pp. 2-4; "Militiamen in Communist China Hold Contests," *Union Research Service* (Hong Kong), Vol. 38, No. 16 (February 23, 1965), pp. 241-254, and Liu Yuncheng, "The Role of People's Militia," *Peking Review*, No. 6 (February 5, 1965), pp. 17-20.

¹⁰ "Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i Issues Orders on Length of Active Service . . .," N.C.N.A., Peking (English), January 19, 1965, in S.C.M.P., No. 3383, p. 1.

he primary objective of this action is to increase the technical and professional competence of the P.L.A. by extending the service of trained personnel. This policy could also expand the size of the armed forces by more than half a million men, but the actual increase will depend on future policy regarding the number to be conscripted each year.

Prior to mid-1960, Communist China was deeply dependent on the U.S.S.R. for military hardware, especially heavy and complex arms and equipment. In recent years, under a campaign of "national self-reliance," the Chinese leaders have made strenuous efforts to develop military self-sufficiency. A very high priority has been given to war industries and petroleum production. Apparently, considerable progress is being made. Chinese industries now adequately supply the P.L.A. with light and medium weapons, including rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, flame throwers, medium artillery, some tanks and probably armored cars. These are mostly Russian-type arms, made from Soviet or modified Soviet blue-prints. Truck production is estimated to have increased in 1964 to 20,000–25,000. Early model radar and electronics equipment are probably being manufactured.

There are also strong indications that surface-to-air missiles and short-range rockets

are being produced.¹¹ Peking claims to have shot down several high altitude Chinese Nationalist U-2 aircraft and also pilotless United States reconnaissance planes since late 1963.¹² Some of these must have been brought down by missiles.

Even more impressive progress is now being made in the aircraft industry. Previously, the Chinese were credited with building trainers, MIG 15 jet fighters and, possibly, MIG 17s. Yet, it was not certain whether the jets were fully manufactured in China or only assembled there, using some Soviet parts. Now reports indicate that MIG 19 fighters are being produced, probably on a limited scale.

Small but increasing numbers of supersonic, delta-wing MIG 21 type planes have also been observed in China. Disagreement exists as to whether or not the MIG 21's are actually being manufactured there. Some believe that they are a Chinese version of the Soviet fighter.¹³ There have been no reports of claims that bomber-type jets are being made in the C.P.R. Nevertheless, if MIG 21's are being manufactured in China, this represents a real jump in military aircraft technology. This is a disturbing possibility, but it is not nearly so crucial to the future peace of the world as is the high priority that Communist China is placing on the development of nuclear weapons.

ATOMIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

On October 16, 1964, Peking first proclaimed to the world that the C.P.R. had exploded an atomic "bomb."¹⁴ On May 14, 1965, a long-delayed second test shot was announced. Actually, the first test shot was not a deliverable bomb, but it was an advanced nuclear device consisting of Uranium 235. Foreign scientists believe that the fissionable material used was probably produced in a costly gaseous diffusion plant. However, it is conceivable that it was developed in a gas centrifuge or by a process of electromagnetic separation.¹⁵ Any one of these methods would represent a technical achievement of a high order. Furthermore, China appears to have two atomic reactors capable

¹¹ *The Military Balance, 1964–65*, p. 9; "Decision for an 'Upsurge,'" *Current Scene*, Vol. III, No. 17 (April 15, 1965), pp. 2–3 and 10; *South China Morning Post*, January 26, 1965; *Hong Kong Standard*, March 5, 1965; Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 224. In December, 1964, Prince Sihanouk stated that the C.P.R. had agreed to provide Cambodia with military equipment, including "heavy artillery," for 2,000 men. See *China Mail* (Hong Kong), December 28, 1964.

¹² See S.C.M.P., No. 3383 (January 25, 1965), p. 3.

¹³ Seymour Topping, "China Reported Building Soviet-type War Planes," *The New York Times* (International Edition), December 30, 1964; "China Making Progress in Weaponry?" *South China Morning Post*, January 26, 1965; *Time*, February 26, 1965, pp. 20–21 and March 12, 1965, p. 9.

¹⁴ "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," *Peking Review*, No. 42, "Special Supplement" (October 16, 1964).

¹⁵ *Japan Times* (Tokyo), October 23, 1964; *Sahi Evening News* (Tokyo), October 22, 1964; *Time*, October 31, 1964, p. 34; *The Military Balance, 1964–65*, pp. 8–9.

of providing weapons-grade plutonium, which is the other fissionable material that has been used to produce atomic weapons.¹⁶

It is true that early atomic tests have no immediate military significance. There is a great difference in terms of cost, skills, time and industrial facilities between early atomic tests and the development of even a limited nuclear capability. The latter must consist of a stockpile of atomic bombs or warheads of a size and shape that permit them to be delivered, plus an effective delivery system. As yet, the C.P.R. does not have this combination of capabilities. Nevertheless, there is a widespread feeling that Communist China's scientific and technical ability and potential have been underestimated.

Since Peking announced its first successful atomic explosion, many scientists and military specialists have upgraded their estimates of Chinese capabilities in the atomic field. Formerly, it was widely assumed that it would require 10 years for China to develop a limited nuclear capability, after she began atomic testing. Now a number of competent analysts have reduced their estimates to five

years.¹⁷ In addition, several qualified Japanese and United States scientists have warned that, given the nature of its first atomic device, Communist China should be able to develop a hydrogen (fusion) bomb at least by the end of this decade.¹⁸

It is also reported that Communist China is placing a very high priority on the development of medium-range ballistic missiles and several American specialists, including the chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, have been quoted as predicting that within the next five years the Chinese will have the ability to deliver nuclear warheads by missile.¹⁹ This will constitute a dangerous nuclear capability

NO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

In the foreseeable future, prospects for peaceful relationships between Communist China and her neighbors or with the United States are not encouraging. There are no indications that the C.P.R. will actually become less aggressive as her military potential increases. China has on its borders a number of *irredenta* areas such as the frontier that led to the conflict with India in 1962. Furthermore, Peking claims that "wars of liberation" are inevitable in this era and that a "tit-for-tat" struggle against the United States is essential.²⁰

The C.P.R. has also officially maintained that "the mastering of nuclear weapons by China is a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world in their struggles."²¹ Although it may not be true that China's foreign minister stated that China would manufacture atomic bombs even if there were no money to make trousers,²² Communist China has clearly expressed its determination to develop nuclear weapons.²³ The only alternative that Peking offers is a nuclear disarmament plan that would be highly advantageous to the C.P.R., which the major foreign powers have indicated will not be accepted.

Peking's proposal does call for a discussion of the question of the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons," but it dismisses many crucial disarmament

¹⁶ John W. Finney, "China May Have 2 Atom Reactors," *The New York Times* (International Edition), October 21, 1964; Morton H. Halperin, "China and the Bomb—Chinese Nuclear Strategy," *China Quarterly*, No. 21 (January–March, 1965), p. 74.

¹⁷ *Japan Times*, October 23 and November 5, 1964; *South China Morning Post*, November 19, 1964; *The New York Times* (International Edition), November 8, 1964; Halperin, *op. cit.*, p. 75; *Hong Kong Standard*, May 23, 1965.

¹⁸ See *South China Morning Post*, October 31, 1964; *Hong Kong Standard*, October 24 and 25, 1964; *Japan Times*, November 5, 1964; *The New York Times* (International Edition), April 30, 1965.

¹⁹ *South China Morning Post*, April 6 and 30, 1965; *South China Sunday Post-Herald*, February 7, 1965; *The Star* (Hong Kong), April 1, 1965; *The New York Times* (International Edition), November 8, 1964, and April 30, 1965.

²⁰ For example, see "The Historical Experience of War Against Fascism," text in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (edition of May 9, 1965), N.C.N.A., Peking, May 8, 1965.

²¹ "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," *Peking Review*, No. 42, "Special Supplement" (October 16, 1964), p. iii.

²² "Chen I Interviewed by Japanese Newsmen," *Kyodo* (in English), Tokyo, October 28, 1963.

²³ See "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," in *op. cit.*, October 16, 1964, p. iv.

ment problems as "minor and side issues." There is no provision for control and inspection, no demand to end nuclear testing, and no call to destroy nuclear delivery systems or installations involved in the development of atomic weapons. Conventional disarmament, which has been referred to as an "illusion," is labelled the "great obstacle to arms reduction." If the atomic powers could be pressured into accepting Peking's proposal it would shift the world balance of power, for it would require the destruction of atomic weapons, while leaving intact Peking's massive conventional forces and even its facilities to develop nuclear arms.²⁴

FUTURE CAPABILITIES

On the basis of this situation, it is assumed that during the late 1960's the leaders of Communist China will continue to make sacrifices to strengthen their already impressive conventional armed forces and will continue to give the highest priority to the development of a nuclear capability. It appears that there will continue to be an increase in the number and variety of conventional weapons that China's factories can produce, but it is doubtful that within the next five years China can produce all important types of heavy equipment. Furthermore, much of the increase in conventional arms production must go to replace worn Soviet equipment.

Continued transportation and airfield construction, especially in the border regions, will gradually increase the strategic mobility of the armed forces. Their tactical mobility is already excellent. The overall technical proficiency of the P.L.A. will probably further improve. Thus the conventional offensive and defensive capabilities of the armed services should moderately advance in the months ahead.

It is in the area of nuclear developments, however, that the most vital developments

will take place and it is believed that Peking will continue to place the heaviest emphasis on this field. It is only prudent to assume that within five years Communist China will be able to threaten all her neighbors with weapons of mass destruction. Yet it would not be rational for her to seek to achieve foreign policy objectives by aggressively employing a limited atomic force. For Peking actually to initiate a nuclear war could be suicidal. Hence, it is believed the Communist Chinese will actually utilize a restricted nuclear force to support political, economic and psychological efforts to advance her objectives. Atomic arms will probably be used primarily as political and psychological weapons.

In the past, the C.P.R.'s principal protections against a major attack have been the Soviet nuclear umbrella over China and the very deep and sincere reluctance of the United States to use its awful nuclear might. Yet Peking continues to attack the interests and influence of the U.S.S.R., as well as those of the United States. She seems determined to remove the Soviet umbrella. In this situation, Communist China's determination to develop atomic weapons may be dangerous to her. In case of a conflict, the fact that she could use some terrible nuclear arms against enemy forces or their allies would increase the possibility of preemptive strikes to destroy Peking's atomic capability. Yet she could not effectively retaliate against the home bases of the attackers. Hence,

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²⁴ See the author's article entitled, "China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reactions," in *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1965. See also "New Starting Point or Efforts to Ban Nuclear Weapons Completely," *Ten-min Jih-pao*, November 22, 1964, in *Peking Review*, No. 48 (November 27, 1964), pp. 12-14.

Writing from Rawalpindi, this specialist emphasizes the fact that diplomatically "... Peking's greatest strength lies in her solid, substantial and expanding core of support in the nonaligned and left-of-center countries, both real (e.g., in Afro-Asia) and potential (e.g., in Latin America)."

Peking and the "Third World"

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CHINA'S FIRST ATOMIC explosion at Lop Nor on October 16, 1964, shook the whole world. Yet a diplomatic exhibition in Peking only two weeks earlier was far more important.¹

On October 1, 1964, "more than 3,000 distinguished guests from over 80 countries and regions in Asia, Africa, Latin America, North America, Europe and Oceania" had gathered in the Chinese capital to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic.² It was a most impressive group and even in the heydays of the Han and Tang dynasties, the Celestial Empire could not have staged a more impressive diplomatic display. But, how strong and significant are China's relationships with the so-called neutral powers?

¹ The author wishes to express appreciation for an F.I.C. Grant made by Colorado State University in support of a larger study from which part of the material for the present article has been drawn.

² *Peking Review*, October 2, 1964.

³ For most of these official opinions thus paraphrased and quoted here, see basically: Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, *Speeches and Statements*, Karachi, Pakistan Publications, 1964, vols. I-VI; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, *Speeches before the United Nations General Assembly, 1957-1965*, and *Speeches before the Security Council, 1964*, Karachi, The Foreign Ministry, 1964-65; also *Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Compendium of Speeches Made in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 1962-64*, Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964. For earlier examples, see H. S. Suhrawardy, Prime Minister of Pakistan, "Foreign Relations and Defense," *Pakistan Quarterly*, Spring, 1957. Current press reports also bear out the general line of argument, only more enthusiastically.

Pakistan offers an excellent case study. Pakistan today recognizes Peking as an exemplary neighbor whose behavior has been politically "impeccable." Any ill feeling between the two countries in the past has been Pakistan's fault and, according to Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan should be "big enough" to admit it. China, after all, is still an empire of great stature to Pakistan and to all of Asia. Her "reconstruction and resurrection" under Communist leadership, as a Pakistani prime minister once put it, cannot be questioned, for the Chinese have developed, in the process, "a democracy of their own." The Chinese people's "intense patriotism" and "utter enthusiasm" are understandable and admirable, especially in view of their country's "impressive entry" into the nuclear club and China's establishment as a "first-rate industrial power."

As for Peking's disputes with India, the Soviet Union and the United States, Peking cannot be held solely responsible. India, as a matter of fact, was the aggressor and initiated the attack on China before October, 1962, in the eyes of Pakistani leaders, just as she did in the cases of Goa and Kashmir.³ China's wish to define her borders with adjacent neighbors—already accomplished in most cases in a peaceful manner, e. g., with Afghanistan, Burma, Mongolia, Nepal and Pakistan itself—is not unusual and should be supported for the sake of the neighbors

themselves. China in Pakistani eyes has no territorial ambitions in South Asia, where her influence has been traditionally absent and where ethnic, linguistic and cultural factors have not been necessarily congenial, just as the Himalayas have stood as a natural barrier. Nor was China seeking war with India or any other state, as evidenced by her voluntary cease-fire and unilateral withdrawal after thorough victory in November, 1962, "for which," in Mr. Bhutto's words, "it would be difficult to find a precedent."

China's approach to her border questions compares favorably with Western behavior on similar occasions; either at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 or in South Asia itself and elsewhere throughout the period of Western imperialist expansion. China has not only insisted on verbal negotiations but has actually concluded agreements and maintained the friendliest possible relations with India herself (up to the conflict) as well as with other neighbors. This is why other neighbors cannot see eye-to-eye with India vis-a-vis China.

As for China's dispute with the Soviet Union, in neutral eyes, its seriousness should not be exaggerated, nor should corresponding "wishful thinking" be much encouraged. The two giant socialist countries are still allies and they are bound to stand together in the event of a major crisis or any conflict with a Western country, as they have professed. If China has been reluctant to admit the Soviet Union readily into the ranks of Afro-Asia, it is only because her argument has a shred of truth—that Russia, after all, has never been regarded as an Asian power, nor was it present at the first official Afro-Asian conference at Bandung. And, in the final analysis, the Soviet-Sino dispute does not concern other nations.

The United States, for her part, could do better, as Pakistanis see it, by adapting her popular liberal domestic opinion to her official policy toward China. Sino-American enmity is a "difficult" but "somewhat artificial situation"; a "break-through" in this area, "if it could come," would constitute "the most important single factor conducive to international peace and security." On the

other hand, continued United States effort to have "the country with the largest population . . . isolated and quarantined from normal international relations" is not only no longer possible but "most dangerous," as made clear in Vietnam and in the continued military buildup in India irrespective of the wishes of allies and an accompanying effort at mediation and reconciliation. Blind encouragement of India, which regards itself as having "inherited" the British Empire in South Asia and tends therefore to be overbearing toward every small neighbor, can only prompt recognition of China as a counterforce and protector.

SINO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Pakistan's relations with China, therefore, are and must be "positive" in nature, and not induced, as India alleges, only by negative considerations. As a relatively small Asian power, Pakistan is not an advocate of "Asia for the Asians"; but like China, she supports Afro-Asian unity. Pakistan is interested in getting rid of her "bum and beggar" image as seen by the United States, as China wants to discard her own "poor and blank" self-designation. Toward this end, Pakistan hopes to achieve independence economically as well as politically through increasing self-reliance and, if possible, by mutual assistance based on a sense of affinity rather than pure utility. China, likewise, is sympathetic toward Pakistan's R.C.D. (Regional Cooperation for Development) strategy. The two countries are also mutually dedicated to the task of wiping out "the last vestige of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism" from the Afro-Asian world.

Although communism, mirrored in China's "upsurge in every field," does have an appeal in Afro-Asia, and although Pakistan itself is not without its vulnerability, Pakistan nonetheless is strengthened by Islamic regeneration and renovation, plus ready protective alliances in case of emergency (as we have seen in India); thus Pakistan need not succumb to ideological inducement or pressure from the north. Communism need not, therefore, discredit the "common cause for peace,"

nor disrupt mutual friendly intercourse, with China, or Soviet Russia.⁴

This overall official Pakistani position has been many times amplified by popular support. Nonofficial Pakistani visitors have often found a trip to China, "a pilgrimage of discoveries." What was successful and promising in that country of "typical Asianhood" became viewed inevitably as the result of the Chinese people's "creative genius" as well as their "inspiring leadership"; in turn, this unmistakably enhanced China's status as a major power.⁵ Chinese success eventually also seemed to reflect the irrelevance and even helplessness of the now "ailing alliances" managed by the West against China.

China's peaceful conduct in the absence of provocation has always been taken to heart by Pakistanis; as is her need for peace for na-

tional development, international friendship and realization of other "legitimate interests." Western military intrusion in the Indian Ocean, like intrusion in Korea, India and Vietnam, or a strategy based on areas "East of Suez" aiming at her, would constitute such provocation to China in Pakistani eyes. The United States and India, so far, seem to have made China, like Pakistan, a victim of their "inhospitality," and induced derogatory "fabrications."⁶ Compared to Pakistan's other big neighbors—India and the Soviet Union—China seems to Pakistanis an infinitely brighter example.⁷ Hence, as if to make up for India's "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" days, Pakistanis, together with their Kashmiri brothers, now frequently hail "China Zindabad," "Pak-China Friendship Zindabad," and even "Chou En-lai Zindabad!" Surely, China has proved India a "paper tiger," and may even have replaced the Soviet Union as the ideological leader of her own camp!⁸

In practical terms, China in recent years has also become the greatest buyer of Pakistani cotton; a new lender, supporter and collaborator in Pakistan's national development; a protector and promoter of Muslim interests and the welfare of the common man internally as well as externally; an exemplar in domestic community development and national defense build-up (through the communes and militia system); a model of stable and inspiring leadership, national unity, and puritanical virtues; and, above all, a big aid in raising Pakistan's international prestige.

Pakistan, too, is willing and able to reciprocate in the international field—with free visas, air, shipping and caravan trade links and so on. With these facilities, Pakistanis now can even celebrate May Day in Peking.⁹ Hence, close Sino-Pakistani relations are only natural, like the popularity of their visitors to each other's country. Pakistan also wants to advance side-by-side with China in a "constructive 'Long March'" in view of their similar social conditions and historical ties. Such a "march" and such ties, as a matter of fact, "have now entered a vital phase and promise to develop into a powerful force that can shape the course of future events," in Africa.

⁴For a semi-official, or officially blessed, exposition on this last issue, see Aslam Siddiqi, *Pakistan Seeks Security* (Lahore: Longmans, Green, 1960).

⁵Beside current newspaper reports, see a book-length account of such a visit by M. A. H. Ispahani, *27 Days in China* (Karachi: Forward Publications, 1960). To this writer's knowledge, other more recent and similarly complimentary accounts are forthcoming.

⁶See especially a book review of Emmanuel John Hevi's *An African Student in China* (New York: Fawcett Publications, 1964) in *Morning News* (Dacca and Karachi), May 9, 1965. The book is extremely derogatory about China and has been partly reproduced by the U.S.I.S. *American Journal* in Karachi; but the Pakistani paper is, in turn, extremely derogatory about the book, and rather sarcastic as well, saying that it "would have been easier to digest if it had been titled 'China—as an American sees it.'"

⁷See especially Qutubuddin Aziz, "Relations between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China," in *Foreign Policy of Pakistan: An Analysis* (Karachi: The Allies Book Corp., 1964).

⁸For the "paper tiger" and "bully" remarks, see M. A. H. Ispahani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: 1947-1964," *Pakistan Horizon*, Third Quarter, 1964. For Chinese leadership in the Communist camp, see two "International Review" columns by "Crystal Gazer," entitled respectively "The Sino-American Confrontation" and "China: Bomb and After," in *Morning News*, March 13 and 27, 1965, where the author uses such terms as "Peking—The New Mecca" and such phrases as "the Communist world led 'til the other day by Russia and now by China."

⁹The recently returned labor delegation on this occasion has been publicizing that "though China professed a different ideology, the Pakistani delegation had a pleasant surprise to find an Islamic social system being pursued there. The Chinese society was completely free from dishonesty, corruption, crimes and social evils" (*Morning News*, May 27, 1965).

as well as Asia. Even an Afro-Asian United Nations, as suggested by Peking in conjunction with Jakarta, has now become a distinct possibility to Pakistanis. Certainly, as the Pakistanis see it, "no power on earth can dismiss 700-million-strong China"; certainly, no one should underestimate the "warmth and goodwill" felt by that "great country for their 100 million neighbors in Pakistan."¹⁰

WIDER ECHOES

But what is more significant is that Pakistan is neither self-centered nor alone in this attitude. There have been echoes resounding from almost every corner of the "Third World," including its sectors in the West, but especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

On the eve of the second Chinese nuclear blast on May 14, 1965, the London *Observer* pointed out, not atypically, that if the "sphere of influence" theory were still to be applied, "then Russia should have its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and China in Asia." The French recognition of Peking had already been hailed by such "satellites" as North Korea as "China's great victory."¹¹ But of greater relevance, evidently, is what non-Communist Asians have felt to be a "trend" toward "Asian self-assertion," accentuated by the fact that "one way or another, most Asian countries were involved" in China's "main preoccupations" in recent years.¹²

¹⁰ Pakistan's official position on Peking's "rival U. N." has been noncommittal, but press opinion has been unanimously enthusiastic. See for example, *Morning News*, January 27, 1965; *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi and Lahore), January 28, and March 9, 1965.

¹¹ See "China's Great Victory," an editorial from North Korea's *Workers Daily*, as presented in *Atlas*, June, 1964.

¹² See the editorial entitled "The Region: Declarations of Independence" and "Foreign Affairs" in the "China" section, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1964 *Yearbook*, Hong Kong, 1964.

¹³ Sato-Johnson Communiqué, January 13, 1965.

¹⁴ Consult Wayne A. Wilcox, *India, Pakistan and the Rise of China*, (New York: Walker, 1964).

¹⁵ The accusation was made by an "extremist communalist party" in India, as reported in *Pakistan Times*, November 13, 1964; and the report, by Reuters in a dispatch from Kuala Lumpur dated October 27, 1964. Malaysian press reaction, as cited, was reflected, for example, in *Nanyang Siang Pau*, October 18, 1964; *Sin Chew Jih Poh*, October 18, 1964.

China, after all, is more "typical" of "Asianhood" than any other Asian country, or even more typical of "Easternhood," than any other Eastern country, since her record of historical continuity and characteristic independent development is unmatched anywhere in the world. She must of necessity occupy a place of distinction in Asia and the non-West.

In East and South Asia, the recent eclipse of both Japan and India behind the Western shadow has made China's ascension inevitable even though Japan must "fundamentally" differ from the United States in her approach to China.¹³ And India, in many eyes, has evidently now learned "to know her place" in Asia vis-a-vis China.¹⁴

In Southeast Asia—China's traditional "sphere of influence"—Indonesia's junior-partner position, like the friendship of Burma and Cambodia, is now common knowledge. Jakarta has not only been "proud" of Peking's recent achievements, but forecasts an "inward" development of the region as a whole in apparent favor of China to counter or replace the West's "containment." Malaysia, and even Thailand, have evinced once again a susceptibility to neutralization since China's first nuclear test. Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, for instance, was accused of handing out "effusive bouquets to China as the first Asian to have the bomb"; he was also reported to have expressed "confidence" in Peking's professed peaceful intentions. The Malaysian press simultaneously substantiated his attitude by clearly, repeatedly, and even favorably, acknowledging the Chinese impact "on the underdeveloped countries in Asia," China's new "capacity to shape the destiny of mankind," her new strengths "like a tiger with added wings," and her "enhanced international stature."¹⁵

Meanwhile Thailand, while crying out loud about possible aggression and making preparations separately and also jointly with Malaysia to stem infiltration from mainland China, as a SEATO member should, somehow quietly, in the wake of Peking's first blast, released a number of imprisoned Thai

Communists and overseas Chinese "deportees" and meted out better treatment for them. Thai leaders were also willing to adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude instead of denouncing or dismissing Peking's peaceful gestures. Some overseas Chinese in Thailand, where they have always pursued a free and prosperous life, were overtly "proud."¹⁶

The Philippines, apparently least susceptible, nonetheless sent newsmen to Peking for the anniversary celebrations in October, 1964, for the first time; and a Philippine senator, running as a vice presidential candidate of the ruling party, suggested at the turn of 1964-1965 that Peking be seated in the United Nations and that a conference of Asian nations, including mainland China, be convened to outlaw nuclear weapons in the region.¹⁷ Australia and New Zealand, as fellow members of SEATO, also tended to compromise.¹⁸ Laos had already been compromised. Only in Vietnam, therefore, has Peking encountered clear outsider-backed opposition.

THE MIDDLE EAST

In the remote Middle East, current reports on possible moves by Turkey and Lebanon to enter into diplomatic relations with Peking are indicative of gradual but significant changes to come, especially since the Chinese Communists have long been laying groundwork in that region. As early as the Yenan days, they not only encouraged the building of mosques in the area under their control,

but made it possible for Chinese Muslims to cooperate with them in their revolutionary program.¹⁹ Muslims outside China, on the other hand, have always been reminded by their Koran to "seek knowledge though it be in China" and, in their view, "there were many features of Chinese aspirations in the early 1920's comparable to those which rightly motivated the current Muslim renaissance in Pakistan and the Arab world."²⁰ Although separated from Chinese communism by ideological inclinations, Muslim irritations with the West—because of direct pressure and indirect support of rivals—have conveniently paved the way for a common cause with Peking in anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism as manifested at the time of the Suez crisis and the enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine (in conjunction with the formation of the CENTO, or Baghdad, alliance thereafter 1956-1959).

As a matter of fact, the Suez crisis and its aftermath, following the Bandung Conference of 1955, constituted a timely boost to Peking's political capital in the Muslim world. In 1955, Peking concluded its first trade agreements with two Middle Eastern countries, Syria and Lebanon (following one with Egypt), although diplomatic links came to be established only later, with Yemen in 1956 and Iraq in 1958. Today, formal ties have not gone far beyond these limits (Israel's recognition has not been reciprocated), but friendly settlement of border questions with Muslim neighbors such as Afghanistan and Pakistan has generated increasing goodwill for Peking in the Middle East in recent years (1960-1965). Nuclear tests have also given Peking opportunities to establish initial contact and communication with some other Middle Eastern countries, such as Jordan, Cyprus, Kuwait, plus the (Arab) "Palestine Liberation Organization" (1964-1965).²¹

Peking's current support for the Arab state against Israel's rapprochement with West Germany is likely to reap even more political dividends. And if, as alleged, Peking has looked for "an Arab Mao" or "non-Arab Mao," it could not have succeeded more conspicuously than today—with U.A.R. Presi-

¹⁶ Hsing Hsien Jih Pao, December 31, 1964; *Nan Chiang Pao*, October 30, 1964; *Chang Hua Wan Pao*, October 27, 1964, and January 29, 1965.

¹⁷ *Morning News*, December 9, 1964; *Pakistan Times*, March 17, 1965.

¹⁸ In late 1964, Australia's Prime Minister and her Foreign Minister both openly pleaded for a "detente" as well as for increasing trade with mainland China.

¹⁹ See John M. H. Lindbeck, "Communism, Islam and Nationalism in China," in *The Review of Politics*, October, 1950.

²⁰ Kenneth Cragg, "The Intellectual Impact of Communism upon Contemporary Islam," *The Middle East Journal*, Spring, 1954.

²¹ One interesting further development from this initial contact was that North Korea, too, started to communicate with Jordan in formal diplomatic notes, whereas Cyprus expressed its readiness to vote for Peking in the U.N.

dent Abdel Nasser and Pakistan President Ayub Khan rising so high in the Muslim world.²² Postnuclear support by these new and old friends in the Middle East aside, Peking's recent air agreement with Iraq (as with the U.A.R.) and Pakistan's continuing assistance, plus Chou En-lai's forthcoming visit to the area, make the Middle East look susceptible to China's influence in the years ahead.²³

Between the Middle East and Africa, Egypt has served as a most important link for Peking. Beginning with a trade agreement in 1955 and diplomatic relations in 1956, Egypt has functioned almost ever since in Peking's favor in the expanding of relations with Muslim states on either side of the Red Sea. As early as 1959, 270 out of 800 foreign delegations visiting Peking were from Africa. In the widely recognized "African Year," 1960, when many new states became independent, Peking established the Sino-African Friendship Association and launched what has been described as a diplomatic "leap forward" in Africa.²⁴ This resulted in the establishment of relations with Peking by just about half of all African states with four of them for the first time joining Cambodia in sponsoring

Peking's admission to the United Nations in late 1964.

For two of these sponsoring African states, Mali and Algeria, Peking's A-bomb was not only a "brilliant victory for China" but "a bomb of peace" as well. The newly-merged state of Tanzania added its voice later affirming that the leaders of China were "men of peace." In this connection, Chou En-lai's policy of friendship and aid to African states, outlined during his local visits in 1963-1964, could not have been better suited to this mentality and atmosphere: it stressed "common backwardness" as well as altruistic assistance. Hardly any "fraternal" counterappeal from the West, or even from the Russians, can genuinely move the Africans as much.²⁵ While in reality Peking's fortune may fluctuate from time to time and from region to region in Africa, it is nevertheless significant that China's nuclear achievement should be hailed as having broken "the color bar." To African partisans in distress, mainland China has now become "the hope of all the oppressed people."²⁶ If there should ever be "color polarization" in this world, Africa, notwithstanding its effort toward an "Africa for the Africans," will have to stand with China.

TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA

Now that Africa and Asia seem to have become inwardly involved with Peking as a leading spirit—with four informal and progressively enlarged "solidarity" conferences and plans for a second diplomatic gathering—their ranks are about to be opened formally to Latin America. Upon the suggestion of the Cuban Ambassador to Ghana, the Fourth Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference recently declared at Winneba that the next meeting, for Afro-Asian-Latin American solidarity, will be convened in Cuba in January, 1966.²⁷

As in Asia and Africa, some local Latin American observers, either in response to Peking's appeal or independently, have seen "a certain parallelism between the sociological conditions prevailing in China and in Latin America."²⁸ On this basis a search for, and discovery of, a "mutuality" by sympathetic

²² Isaac Deutscher, "Moscow, Peking, and Arab Nationalism," *The Reporter*, September 4, 1958. Cf. "Growing Arab Unity against Imperialism," *Peking Review*, September 18, 1964.

²³ About Turkey see, in particular, *Pakistan Times*, January 10, 21, and April 2, 1965; *Morning News*, January 13, March 30, 31, April 9, 17, 1965. About Lebanon, see *Pakistan Times*, February 17, 1965.

²⁴ See Fritz Schattén, "Peking's Influence in Africa," *Military Review*, August, 1961. Cf. Richard Lowenthal, "China," in *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).

²⁵ See the analyses of Edmund Taylor, in "The Chinese Invasion of North Africa," *The Reporter*, September 17, 1959; I. W. Zartman, in "Communist China and the Arab-African Area," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September, 1960; and P. Fitzgerald, in "The Sino-Soviet Balance Sheet in the Underdeveloped Areas," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1964.

²⁶ Walker Kolarz, "The West African Scene," in *ed World in Tumult: Communist Foreign Policies* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), p. 217.

²⁷ Reuters dispatch, May 18, 1965, Winneba, Ghana.

²⁸ Salvador de Madariaga, *Latin America between the Eagle and the Bear* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 163.

elements on both sides took place as early as 1949–1956. Chinese “people’s diplomacy” started to play a positive role in Latin America from 1956 onwards. This eventually culminated in the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with a revolutionized Cuba in 1960. By this time, surprisingly, “Peking had established informal contacts and non-diplomatic relations not only with all of the 20 republics south of the Rio Grande, but also with 3 other territories in the Caribbean area—the French Martinique, the French Guadeloupe, and Dutch Guiana—plus Puerto Rico.”²⁹

Relations of this kind may be thin and precarious and subject to easy frustration and fragmentation in the face of objection and suppression by local governmental authorities outside Cuba. Yet the cumulative effects on the Hemisphere as a whole cannot be wholly dismissed. In 1952, for instance, “peace”-conscious groups went from all 11 Latin American states bordering on the Pacific to attend the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions in Peking, after which a permanent liaison committee was established to include one or more members from all these countries, to carry out “peace” work on a coordinated basis on both sides of the Pacific. In 1956, over 50 delegates from Communist parties in 11 Latin American countries attended the eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist party in Peking, where Mao Tse-tung pronounced his determination to give “active support to the national independence and liberation movement in countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.” Between 1956 and 1959, parliamentary members and groups of 9 Latin American countries visited mainland China; and after they returned home, many started

to advocate “normal relations” with Peking.

Peking, on its part, also sent delegates to Latin America, as many as eight in 1958 and nine in 1959. In 1960, in response to the locally instituted “Latin American People’s Week of Solidarity,” Peking set up a new Sino-Latin American Friendship Association and sponsored a “Support-the-Latin-American-People Week.” Greetings were sent to all “friendship societies” in Latin America that had sprung up since 1952, which numbered about two dozen in nine countries by that time. In the midst of Peking’s eleventh anniversary celebrations, delegations from 15 Latin American countries came forward to sign three significant statements of “solidarity,” among which the “Declaration on National Friendship Associations of the Latin American Countries and China” further testified that “Our delegations represent different political tendencies, professions and activities. However, we are of the identical view that the current experience in struggling against imperialism and feudal backwardness and in building a new China is of extraordinary significance to all Latin America.”³⁰ Throughout that year, as many as 168 “tourist” delegations had gone to China to indicate this solidarity, which should be viewed as another “great leap forward.”³¹

At the turn of 1960–1961, “a friendship week to celebrate the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the national struggle in Latin American countries and the second anniversary of the victory of the Cuban revolution” was further instituted in Peking to signify a “qualitative change” in appeal; Latin Americans were exhorted to “complete the revolutionary cause left unfinished by their forefathers 150 years ago,” thus merging historical and contemporary political trends in a new powerful, and potentially disruptive, uncurrent.

Was Latin America designated “primarily a Chinese sphere of influence,” then? No necessarily. But mainland China could be viewed as “a model for social and economic revolution in Latin America.”³² There have been ups and downs in the development of these clearly recognizable patterns of Sino-Latin

²⁹ This writer’s paper, entitled “Peking and Latin America: 1949–60,” presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Chicago, March, 1961.

³⁰ N.C.N.A. (New China News Agency) release, October 5, 1960.

³¹ According to Robert J. Alexander, “Latin America and the Communist Bloc,” *Current History*, February, 1963, p. 74.

³² See a discussion by Josef Kalvoda in “Communist Strategy in Latin America,” *The Yale Review*, Autumn, 1960.

American relations in recent years. Yet we see that, despite such vicissitudes, Cuba today nevertheless has reason, as in Castro's quote from Mao, to feel like "the single spark that can start a prairie fire" in such a highly conducive atmosphere in Latin America.³³

PEKING'S STRENGTH

What does all this mean? Peking, on its own and in its own fashion, has "arrived." Not many countries are equipped, or dare, to take on both "superpowers" plus a huge neighbor at the same time. Peking, choosing to resist or to push back the United States and the Soviet Union on either side, seems to have to tramp over India in order to march into a receptive "Third World," which is no longer limited to Asia, Africa and Latin America. Peking's established diplomatic relations already include over 15 European states—East and West as well. Then, too, formal diplomatic links are not needed for Peking to do business or communicate with other countries, and vice versa. This is why over "80 countries and areas" were represented in Peking in October, 1964, while Peking was reportedly trading with "125 countries and areas" at the same time.³⁴ Even at the May Day celebrations in 1965, "trade unionists and friends from over 70 countries" were present in Peking.³⁵ In point of fact, it has always been the Peking leaders' claim that those countries which maintain relations with Peking represent the overwhelming majority of both the population and the sovereign territories of the entire earth.

As for power politics, Peking's relations with these countries cut across most of the existing Western alliances, directly affecting 5 out of

15 members in NATO, 3 out of 8 in SEATO, 2 out of 4 (or 5, counting the United States) in CENTO, and 1 out of 21 in the (original) O.A.S. Even in an organization like the Arab League, 7 out of 13 members maintain formal diplomatic relationships with Peking. Small wonder that, with opportune pressures from within and without, Peking can make many an "ailing alliance" groan audibly.³⁶

But Peking's greatest strength lies in her solid, substantial and expanding core of support in the nonaligned and left-of-center countries, both real (e. g., in Afro-Asia) and potential (e. g., in Latin America). Analysts agree that, as far as Peking's general policy is concerned, there is, besides minimum security and maximum authority, always a medium or intermediate goal of major—or "super"—power status. This includes a desire for what one writer has termed a "friendly domination" over political and economic developments in China's immediate neighborhood and peripheral sphere of influence, and also, if and whenever possible, the further formation of an "international united front" with like-minded friends vis-a-vis the West.

To the extent that such a policy runs counter to the realistic interest of the target countries and areas, Communist China may be viewed as a "menace." So, to the extent that such a policy coincides with and supports the efforts being made by the target countries and areas themselves, Peking is likely to become a needed supporter, a model, a leader, or a benefactor.

Hence, the allusions and delusions in international affairs and foreign policy questions need careful differentiation today. At stake is the enlightened self-interest of any truly responsible major power—if not the welfare of all mankind.

³³ See a thorough treatment by Peter S. H. Fang, entitled *The Chinese Communist Impact on Cuba* (Chestnut Hill, Mass.: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1962). Cf. a study with similar conclusion by Pablo Piacentini, entitled "Latin America's Reds Choose Sides: China or Russia," published in *Il Punto* (Rome) and translated in *Atlas*, April, 1965.

³⁴ N.C.N.A. release, October 2, 1964.

³⁵ N.C.N.A. release, May 1, 1965.

³⁶ See an editorial comment in *Pakistan Times*, May 17, 1965, beginning with what was viewed as a divided and recalcitrant NATO on Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, and extending to "halfhearted" SEATO and CENTO and, by implication, also to the Arab League.

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"The extension of Communist China's foreign aid program . . .," writes this student of Chinese affairs, "cannot be considered apart from its coincidence with a major diplomatic offensive in the Afro-Asian world."

Communist China's Foreign Aid Program

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COMMUNIST CHINA's foreign economic aid program has been augmented considerably in the last five years. Prior to 1960, the value of assistance promised by China to nations outside the Communist orbit was approximately \$87 million, shared by seven countries. Since then the amount has increased roughly ninefold; through the first quarter of 1965, total reported¹ Chinese commitments were over \$750 million, with 19 countries on the receiving end. (See Table I.)

Although China's aid (loans and gifts) quantitatively makes a poor comparison with that of the United States or the Soviet Union, it is standing up well under the competition for political influence. The favorable terms on which Chinese aid is offered, the subtlety with which political aims are obscured, and the timeliness which seems to guide a choice of recipients combine to multiply the effectiveness of China's offers. On the other hand,

¹For obvious domestic political reasons, the Chinese never give the figures involved in aid. Amounts are invariably reported by sources of the recipient country.

²The eight principles were first made public during Chou En-lai's visit to Mali. See the joint communiqué as reported by the New China News Agency (N.C.N.A., Peking), January 21, 1964, in American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of China Mainland Press (S.C.M.P.)*, No. 3146, January 24, 1964, p. 30.

³The five principles reflect China's support for African independence struggles, unity, sovereignty, and nonalignment policies. See the Sino-Algerian Communiqué, N.C.N.A. (Peking), December 28, 1963, in *ibid.*, No. 3131, January 3, 1964, p. 27.

the Chinese Communist program contains some inherent weaknesses which may severely hamper the larger political ambitions aid is supposed to help realize.

How the Chinese describe their aid program provides an insight into how a rich political harvest may on occasion be reaped from few seeds. Since 1962, Peking has been expounding the virtues of national "self-reliance": to be truly independent of foreign interference or domination, nations should rely primarily on their own resources for development and only secondarily upon outside support. Toward that end, Peking's policy in providing aid to "the socialist camp" or to emerging nations is said to be guided by eight principles: equality and mutual benefit; respect for the sovereignty of the recipient; lenient terms of interest on loans (if any) and of repayment; self-reliance; projects promising a quick yield on a small investment; high-quality equipment and material provided at world prices; dispatch of qualified technical personnel; living standards of Chinese personnel no more than equivalent to those of the recipient's experts.²

China's alleged unconcern about benefiting economically from foreign aid is paralleled by an avowed disinterest in acquiring political advantage. Thus, Premier Chou En-lai, touring ten African states between December, 1963, and February, 1964, implicitly linked China's aid program to "five principles" of its African policy³ and to the "ten principles" of

TABLE I: C.P.R. ECONOMIC AID AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS (in millions of U.S. dollars)

Year	Category	Africa	Mid-East	Asia	Totals
1956-59	G		Egypt, \$5 ('56)	Cambodia, \$22 ('56) Nepal, \$13 ('56) Ceylon, \$16 ('57) Burma, \$4.2 ('57)	G = \$ 60.2
	L		Yemen, \$16 ('58)	Ceylon, \$10.5 ('58)	L = \$ 26.5
					\$ 86.7
1960	G	Congo (L), \$3			G = \$ 3.0
	L	Guinea, \$25		Nepal, \$21	L = \$ 46.0
					\$ 49.0
1961	L	Ghana, \$19.6 Mali, \$20		Nepal, \$9.8 Burma, \$84	
					\$133.4
1962	L			Indonesia, \$30	
					\$ 30.0
1963	G	Somalia, \$3			G = \$ 3.0
	L	Somalia, \$22 Algeria, \$50	Syria, \$16.2		L = \$ 88.2
					\$ 91.2
1964	G	Kenya, \$3		Ceylon, \$4.2	G = \$ 7.2
	L	Tanzania (Z), \$.5 Kenya, \$15 Tanzania (T), \$14.5 Tanzania, \$28 Congo (B), \$5 Ghana, \$22.4	Yemen, \$28	Ceylon, \$3.1	
					L = \$116.5
					\$123.7
1965	L	Congo (B), \$20	Egypt, \$80	Indonesia, \$50 Nepal, \$1.3 Pakistan, \$58.8 Afghanistan, \$28	
					\$238.1
Totals	G	\$ 9.0	\$ 21.0	\$ 59.4	= \$ 89.4
	L	\$242.0	\$124.2	\$296.5	= \$662.7
		\$251.0	\$145.2	\$355.9	\$752.1

KEY: G = gifts, L = loans; (L) = Leopoldville; (Z) = Zanzibar; (T) = Tanganyika; (B) = Brazzaville.

the Bandung Conference (the first Afro-Asian Conference, held in 1955).⁴

⁴ The ten principles refer to China's support for the basic concepts of "peaceful coexistence": territorial integrity, nonintervention, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, to mention three. The principles were part of the Final Statement of the Afro-Asian Conference (April 24, 1955): see *Jen-nin shou-ts'ei* [People's Handbook] (Tientsin, 1956), pp. 379-80.

Evaluation of China's foreign aid principles requires an investigation into the actual content of the program. Economic assistance follows two distinct lines: outright grants or gifts, and long-term loans on a low-interest or interest-free basis. In the first category, the Chinese have demonstrated a keen aptitude for making political capital of economic

emergencies abroad by granting outright relatively small amounts of money without strings. Thus Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba reportedly received \$3 million in 1960 while fighting in vain to hold the Congo. Egypt obtained \$5 million following the Suez crisis in 1956. Kenya and Somalia have been the beneficiaries of \$3 million each in 1964 to alleviate budget deficits. Finally, Ceylon has been granted over \$20 million in gifts through 1964, including one for \$4.2 million in textiles that year to help overcome a sudden shortage. Although small by most standards, these windfalls from Peking probably make significant inroads upon Afro-Asian sentiment inasmuch as they come from a nation which can ill afford to give away its limited wealth.

Precisely what percentage of China's pledges has actually been delivered is, however, another question. There is reason to believe that Peking has made good on only a small fraction of its commitments. One observer has estimated that prospective African recipients have seen less than 25 per cent of aid promised them by Communist China.⁵

Of more lasting effect are the increasing number of loans on liberal terms being granted by the C.P.R. (Chinese People's Republic). In contrast to Soviet loans, those from China are mostly interest-free, with a very few at low interest rates. The repayment period usually runs from 10 to 20 years, and the Chinese claim the period may be extended "when a recipient country finds real difficulty in repaying. . . ."⁶ The form of repayment is also enlightening. In at least one instance—the C.P.R.-Pakistan credit arrangement of 1965—the recipient has been allowed to repay in primary products (here,

cotton, jute and jute manufactures) in lieu of cash.⁷ This agreement may set the pattern for future loans.

China's loans have most often not taken the form of cash payments; the Chinese have instead provided the technicians and materials while the recipient has provided the manual labor. Thus, Chinese personnel have been sent to Algeria to construct a trans-Saharan rail line; to the Congo (Brazzaville) to help set up small industries; to Yemen for highway construction; to Ghana for agricultural projects and factory construction; and to Nepal for construction of a major highway. Similarly, a \$28 million loan to Tanzania in 1964 took the form of a textile mill (the Mao Tse-tung Mill), an experimental farm and a factory for the manufacture of farm tools. Chinese materials accompanied experts on the 1964 Ghana projects. This year's \$80 million loan to Egypt will reportedly be given in industrial equipment. Finally, four factories completed in Cambodia in 1962 through C.P.R. aid were said to have been equipped in full by the Chinese.

As welcome as these technicians and materials may be, the underdeveloped countries would probably find foreign exchange even more desirable; and when it comes to hard currency, the Chinese are at a serious disadvantage in competition with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Chinese experts and materials are sent, according to Peking, in strict accordance with the "eight principles" previously mentioned. Experts, it is claimed, have no ulterior (political) motives, neither ask for nor enjoy special privileges, and remain until the job is finished.⁸ This policy is contrasted with the politically-tied assistance of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Soviet experts, as well as Americans, have been charged with having political missions in the states to which they are sent; and the vast resources of the Soviet economy, the Chinese further insist, are used to influence the policies of the recipient nations. On its part, with one exception, Nepal,⁹ China has had no accusations made against its technicians. Moreover, no recipients have voiced complaints with regard to

⁵ Daniel Wolfstone, "Sino-African Economics," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, XLIII (February 13, 1964), No. 7, 350.

⁶ Ai Ching-chu, "China's Economic and Technical Aid to Other Countries," *Peking Review*, No. 34 (August 21, 1964), 17.

⁷ *Far East Trade & Development*, XIX (October, 1964), No. 10, 1109 and XX (March, 1965), No. 3, 237.

⁸ Ai Ching-chu, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

⁹ See the report of a defector from the Chinese aid mission in Denis Warner, "China Fans the Fires," *The Reporter*, January 14, 1965, p. 19.

materials, which Peking insists are "of the best possible quality in terms of [the] present Chinese technological level."¹⁰

Nevertheless, recent Soviet gibes have pointed up glaring weaknesses in the operational end of the Chinese program. Despite China's stress on fulfilling all contracts, the Soviets have asserted that (as of mid-1964) Peking had neither completed any of three projects promised to Nepal for early 1963 nor begun any projects expected by the Burmese and Indonesians under 1961 agreements. Factory inefficiencies and substandard technical work were declared responsible for the failures of a plywood factory and metallurgical plant for Cambodia in 1962 and 1963.¹¹

Seeking to override these setbacks—all of which, it is interesting to observe, have occurred in Asian countries—the C.P.R. points out that, in contrast with other aid-givers, it seeks to help recipients diversify their agriculture and build a complete industrial process. Projects suited to the needs of the recipient—notably, those by which it may process its own raw materials or daily necessities—are selected instead of impact projects.¹² These criteria are important not only to the recipients but to Chinese propaganda. Nan Han-chen said at the 1964 Asian Economic Seminar:

In dealing with the Asian and African countries, they [the Soviets] sometimes provide the machinery while holding back the key units and parts; sometimes they provide equipment while withholding technical knowledge, trying all they can to make the Asian and African countries economically dependent on them.¹³

Nan was, of course, speaking from China's personal experience with the U.S.S.R.; but his statement was intended as a warning to

recipients of Soviet aid that they could not expect the kind of treatment accorded under China's "eight principles," which supposedly foster economic independence.

The Chinese have capitalized on racial differences as well, aligning with the exploited colored peoples against the white nations. Peking has sought to play down its use of the race issue. But the Soviets have attacked Communist China for coupling racist appeals with the "eight principles" "in order to prompt the African countries to reject the aid of the Soviet Union, which they [the Chinese] say is offered with the same aim in mind as the aid of the United States of America."¹⁴

The C.P.R.'s focal point, despite any denials, is the acquisition of political benefits from its aid program. With a view toward the long-range goal of leadership of the Afro-Asian community, Peking consistently stresses the great similarity between its suffering under the heavy hand of imperialism and that of the other Afro-Asian states. Concomitantly, by also emphasizing noninterference and respect for the sovereignty of other states in accord with the "five" and "ten" principles, the C.P.R. lets it be known that it seeks an alliance against the "imperialist forces" based upon the principle of national independence of action.

Temporarily at least, the Chinese would appear content to be a major part of the still amorphous Afro-Asian "bloc" rather than demanding acknowledgment as its leader. As Premier Chou En-lai told a Malian audience on his tour of ten African states, the Chinese want Africans to "free themselves from colonialist domination and increase the strength of the anti-imperialist forces of the world—this constitutes a great support and aid to China."¹⁵

By preaching the line of "united but separate," the Chinese seek to wean Afro-Asian states away from a pro-Soviet or pro-American position. Despite Peking's voluble support for "national liberation wars" and "national independence movements," it is doubtful whether Communist China wants to go beyond encouraging the underdeveloped nations to keep free of American and Soviet

¹⁰ Ai Ching chu, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹¹ See a statement by *Izvestia* cited in *The China Quarterly*, No. 20 (October-December, 1964), p. 182, and in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, XLV (July 23, 1964), No. 4, p. 150.

¹² Ai Ching-chu, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

¹³ "For an Independent, Prosperous, New Asia," *Peking Review*, No. 27 (July 3, 1964), p. 20.

¹⁴ *Izvestia*, August 2, 1964, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XVI (August 26, 1964), No. 31, p. 7.

¹⁵ N.C.N.A. (Koulikoro), January 17, 1964, in S.C.M.P. No. 3144, January 22, 1964, p. 35.

entanglements—unless, as in South Vietnam, the nation in question happens to be both a national and revolutionary interest of the C.P.R.

In Africa, where about 37 per cent of China's overt commitments have been made, aid helps Peking to be remembered and respected; but Maoism is unlikely to displace the distinctly African routes to socialism being followed in Algeria, Guinea, Ghana and elsewhere. And since China cannot compete "dollar for dollar" with either the U.S.S.R. or the United States, Peking is bound to experience difficulty in many countries when it tries to make a case for rugged individualism in the face of massive offers of cash assistance. In short, China is gambling that untied aid, racialism, and alleged United States and Soviet interventionist ambitions will bridge geographic, financial and ideological gaps.

Much the same situation holds true in Asia, although for different reasons. Neutrality and nonalignment, as the Chinese recognized a decade ago, may be acceptable ways of securing China's long-term interests in Asia without excessive costs and risks. Aid has therefore become an instrument for assuring at least favorable sentiment toward Peking in Ceylon, Burma and Nepal. Cambodia, Pakistan and Indonesia have their own reasons for supporting various Chinese international positions and for accepting Chinese credits; but it is highly doubtful whether Peking could, or wants to, dominate physically any of its beneficiaries in the near future. The strong reaction in Africa and Asia against the Indian border warfare, for which China continues to pay in terms of influence, has shown Peking that proclamation of the "five" and "ten" principles cannot be respected when overt military action is also an element of Chinese foreign policy.

The extension of Communist China's foreign aid program therefore cannot be considered apart from its coincidence with a major diplomatic offensive in the Afro-Asian world. The journey of Chou En-lai, accompanied by Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, illustrated the political motivation behind the Chinese program. Promises of funds and

propagandizing of the "five" and "ten" principles were dictated by Chou's quest for backing of China's foreign policy goals. In checklist fashion, each final communiqué elucidated the extent of success or failure of China's request for: a second Bandung Conference; the total destruction of nuclear weapons and complete disarmament; nuclear-free zones; settlement or mollification of the Indian border dispute; a C.P.R. seat in the United Nations; abolition of the "two Chinas" concept, and restoration of Taiwan to the mainland. On an item-by-item basis, the tour was only partially successful. But at a total potential cost to the C.P.R. of \$146.5 million in promised aid, Chou gained invaluable experience in dealing with Africans, extended China's influence and prestige, and acquired—then and in later months—additional diplomatic recognition to put the C.P.R. ahead of the Nationalist regime. By the end of the tour it was clear that the Chinese influence had spread in Africa and deepened in South Asia.

Since the African swing of 1963–1964 Ch'en Yi has visited Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal (December, 1964, and March, 1965), while Premier Chou recently ended a trip to the U.A.R. and Algeria. The ultimate significance of these tours may rest with the striking parallels they bear to the pre-Bandung Conference period. In mid-1954 it will be recalled, several months before Bandung but in the midst of the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, China opportunistically launched a drive to gain support for the "five principles" of peaceful coexistence. Although unable to use aid as a political enticement due to a lack of surplus funds, the C.P.R. reached agreements with India and Burma which embodied the five prin-

(Continued on page 181)

Melvin Gurtov is currently on a grant from the East Asian Institute to finish his book *Crisis in Indonesia: Communist Chinese Strategy and the Problem of American Intervention, 1953–1954*. He will spend the 1965–66 academic year in Taiwan on a research award

According to this expert, "The Communists boast that one out of every four persons in the entire country is engaged in some form of schooling." He concludes that "Even discounting the accuracy of statistical reports, one cannot fail to appreciate the magnitude of the educational program on the Chinese mainland today."

New Citizens for a New Society

By THEODORE H. E. CHEN

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THE CELEBRATION of the "Chinese New Year" has been a long established tradition of the Chinese people. Wherever Chinese people congregate, whether in Southeast Asia, in Latin America, or in the Chinatowns of America, the Chinese New Year is always an occasion for fun, relaxation, feasting—a gay holiday season.

The Chinese Communists have set out to change this tradition. They have asked the Chinese people to discard the bad customs of feudal and bourgeois society. Instead of an occasion for meaningless fun-making, the New Year should provide an opportunity for further "ideological education."

Another Communist assault on a tradition which has been considered a unique aspect of popular culture in China is the current campaign to reform the "Peking opera," to make it a medium of political propaganda and ideological indoctrination. Episodes from China's rich folklore and historical legends are to be replaced by themes of political significance. The classical drama is being replaced by a "proletarian art" which offers a new repertoire of "revolutionary" plays portraying the class struggle and designed to instill patriotic and revolutionary sentiments. In line with the current campaign for better use of fertilizers in farming, for example, a new play carries the proletarian

title "Delivering the Manure," and the center of the stage is decorated with a pot of natural fertilizer.

Even funeral rites are being reformulated so that they may have an "educational meaning." The reforms here cited are only examples of how the Chinese Communists have undertaken to transform Chinese society and to remold the thinking and the behavior of the people. Such remolding, concerned with changes in attitudes and emotions as well as in overt behavior, cannot be accomplished by decree or by the use of stark force. It must rely on many and varied forms of "persuasion," ranging from the indirect and relatively gentle to the direct and persistent, verging on coercion. They are the methods of propaganda, indoctrination and education which, in the Communist lexicon, are practically synonymous.

Another reason why the Communists put a high premium on education is that they are not satisfied with passive obedience or the mere absence of opposition. They demand active support and whole-hearted participation. The Party says the masses must be taught to share the Communist conviction in regard to the absolute correctness of Marxist ideology and revolutionary goals. Such results can be obtained only by a ceaseless program of education and propaganda

reaching into every last corner of the land.

It is obvious, then, that Communist education is not only inseparable from propaganda and indoctrination, but it also encompasses the whole range of formal and informal agencies of instruction and the mass media of communication. All that impinges upon the minds and hearts of the people comes under the purview of education. And the entire program is governed by the same overall aim, the making of new citizens for the proletarian-socialist society.

Specifically, the immediate objectives of education may be stated as follows: (1) to produce a literate population so that the masses may be able to respond to the propaganda and indoctrination directed to them; (2) to develop a new outlook, new loyalties, and new concepts of happiness in a collective society; (3) to produce the vast number of skilled workers and technical personnel needed to carry out the multitudinous tasks of the five-year plans; and (4) to remold the "old intellectuals" so that they may discard old thought patterns, make a clean break with the past, and dedicate themselves to the new society.

ROLE OF THE SCHOOL

This is no small order, but Communist education aims at the real transformation of the entire society. What educationalists in non-Communist countries lament as a gap between school and society is being eliminated.

This is not mere talk. The record of the last 15 years shows that such an ambitious program has already made a good start. As a matter of fact, the extension of educational opportunity and the expansion of educational facilities must be considered among the most impressive achievements of the Chinese Communist regime. Granted that Communist statistics are far from accurate, comparative figures may still give a general picture of the rapid growth that has taken place. Table I, published by the Communist State Statistical Bureau, provides such a picture.

The regular schools and colleges are only a part of the educational program. Besides the full-time day schools, there are "half-study, half-work schools," evening schools, correspondence schools, and many forms of "spare-time education." The remolding or "thought reform" of the intellectuals is carried out in institutions, forums and special classes which are as much a part of the program of making the new socialist man as the schools. And, in addition, there is a vast complex of mass media from newspapers to the radio and the numerous "mass campaigns" which subject the population to a continuous barrage of propaganda and indoctrination telling the people what to think and how to feel and act.

The part-time schools and spare-time schools (to be discussed later in this article) are more important for the adult population than the full-time schools. In 1958, when a

TABLE I: STUDENT ENROLLMENT

Year	Institutes of Higher Learning	Technical Middle Schools	Middle Schools	Primary Schools	Kindergarten
Pre-1949 peak year	155,000	383,000	1,496,000	23,683,000	130,000
1949	117,000	229,000	1,039,000	24,391,000	
1950	137,000	257,000	1,305,000	28,024,000	140,000
1951	153,000	383,000	1,568,000	43,154,000	
1952	191,000	636,000	2,490,000	51,100,000	424,000
1953	212,000	668,000	2,933,000	51,664,000	
1954	253,000	608,000	3,587,000	51,218,000	
1955	288,000	537,000	3,900,000	53,126,000	
1956	403,000	812,000	5,165,000	63,464,000	
1957	441,000	778,000	6,281,000	64,279,000	1,088,000
1958	660,000	1,470,000	8,520,000	86,400,000	29,501,000

TABLE II: EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS RUN BY FACTORIES

	Schools	Students
Colleges and universities	94	12,000
Secondary technical schools	1,056	190,000
Middle schools	600	140,000
Primary schools	6,700	900,000
Spare-time colleges and universities	600	115,000
Spare-time secondary technical schools	1,500	270,000
Spare-time middle schools	56,000	2,680,000
Spare-time primary schools	200,000	9,280,000
Red and expert colleges and schools	17,000	1,170,000
	<u>283,550</u>	<u>14,757,000</u>

TABLE III: SCHOOLS RUN BY PEOPLE'S COMMUNES

	Schools	Students
Agricultural and other technical middle schools	75,000	4,220,000
Middle schools	22,000	1,930,000
Primary schools	480,000	29,700,000
Spare-time middle schools	37,000	1,790,000
Spare-time primary schools	480,000	21,600,000
Red and expert colleges and schools	320,000	22,200,000
	<u>1,414,000</u>	<u>81,440,000</u>

big drive was launched to have factories and communes establish their own schools, the increase in spare-time schools was even more phenomenal than that of the regular schools. *The Peking Review*, an official publication of the Peking government, issued relevant figures in its December 2, 1958, issue (see Tables II and III).

With such a wide range of schools available for toddlers, adults, as well as school-age children, the Communists boast that one out of every four persons in the entire country is engaged in some form of schooling. Even discounting the accuracy of statistical reports, one cannot fail to appreciate the magnitude of the educational program on the Chinese mainland. Of course, it's true that much of what goes by the name of education is really propaganda which warps, and does not enlighten, the mind. Nevertheless, in a predominantly illiterate country with a woeful lack of educational opportunity, the phenomenal growth in quantity, even at the expense of quality, must be recognized as a significant achievement.

There are three cardinal principles of educational policy: (1) education must serve proletarian politics; (2) it must be com-

bined with productive labor; and (3) it must be under the direction of the Communist party.

In education, as in economic development and all other phases of life, the slogan that guides all activities is, "Let politics take command." All actions and educational policies must be judged in the light of politics. Every phase of education must directly serve the proletarian cause; even in the literacy classes, lessons on the class struggle must not be neglected.

But politics in schools is not confined to classroom study. Following the Marxist dictum that theory and knowledge must be applied to action, the Communists maintain that political study in the classroom must be reinforced by "revolutionary action." At any given time, the Party issues a list of approved "revolutionary activities" for teachers and students. These range from helping to clean the school grounds to participating in parades and demonstrations against American imperialism or in support of Cuba or Albania.

A specific form of political education is "class education." Since 1960, the Communists have stepped up the campaign for

"class education." The campaign is not confined to the schools and is directed at the entire population. It is said that a central aim of "socialist education" is to sharpen class consciousness, and this can be achieved only by a systematic and vigorous program of "class education."

CLASS EDUCATION

In the schools, the study of Marxism-Leninism and the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" continues to occupy a central place in the curriculum. In addition, a new method of class education extensively used in the schools and in the whole country is the study of "histories," meaning a comparison of conditions before and after the Communist "liberation." There is much talk of education by "four histories" or "five histories." These refer to the school history, the family history, the factory history, the commune history, the village history or (in cities) the street history. In each case, the study consists of exposing the evils of the past and glorifying the achievements of the present in order to bring out the sharp contrast between "feudal" (pre-Communist) society and socialist society, thus developing an intense hatred for the old and a dedicated love for the new.

In schools, in villages, in factories and elsewhere throughout the country, groups gather for the study of these histories. Materials for study are supplied by the Party organizations in each area and by older people who retell from personal memory the stories of exploitation and misery descriptive of pre-Communist society. Students compare the educational growth of today with the educational negligence of the past; villagers relate the evil deeds of cruel landlords, unscrupulous despots, and heartless moneylenders of pre-1949 days; workers recall the exploitative practices of capitalists and industrialists who disregarded the welfare of workers; inhabitants of a street remind one another how they had been at the mercy of hoodlums under the protection of corrupt officials.

The Communists realize that harping on

class consciousness and the class struggle may become monotonous and lose its appeal. To avoid monotony, they advise the use of a variety of methods. Exhibits have been prepared to show the corrupt life of former despots and exploiters of the people; cartoons and stage plays liven up the "study"; the young go to the older members for personal recollections. School children in Honan province are asked to visit and interview "five kinds of old people," namely, old peasants, old workers, old cadres, army veterans, and old Party members. The Party publishes an approved list of "old people" who may be asked to talk with school children and serve as "teachers of class education." Students write reports of what they learn about the evils of the old society and the achievements of the new, and these are compiled to form "live materials" of class education to be displayed in exhibits, with pictures and graphs, and deposited in libraries. Concrete examples, it is said, are more interesting and more convincing than abstract talk.

LABOR AND PRODUCTION

The second cardinal principle of education is that it must be combined with productive labor. Labor is given the utmost importance in Communist ideology. Man created the world by means of labor; he advanced beyond the lower animals by virtue of his ability to labor. The working class is supreme in proletarian society because it is the laboring class. By the same token, the bourgeoisie and the "white-collar classes" of bourgeois society can become acceptable members of the new society only if they learn to engage in labor. It is this reasoning that justifies the maintenance of "labor camps" in which landlords, counterrevolutionaries, and reactionary elements are compelled to "reform themselves through labor." Labor and production are inseparable. Students and faculty are required to spend time on the farm or in the factory. Old-time intellectuals must engage in labor and production in order to transform themselves into proletarian intellectuals. The require-

ment of actual participation in production applies to all types of schools, from the elementary schools to the universities and the professional schools. In some cases, students are released from study at certain times of the month or the year for work on farms, or in factories, mines, or business enterprises. In many cases, the schools operate on the basis of "half-study and half-work."

To facilitate the combination of education with production and labor, schools and universities have been urged to establish factories and business enterprises under their own auspices so that centers of learning may at the same time serve as "centers of production." Conversely, the establishment of schools by farms, factories, communes and business enterprises makes them "centers of learning" as well as "centers of production." In this way, the Communist theoreticians claim they are bridging the gap between manual and mental labor and paving the way for a classless proletarian society.

It is scarcely necessary to point out that combining productive labor with education not only serves an educational and ideological purpose, but also greatly enhances the productive manpower of the nation when the increase of production is one of the major objectives of official policy.

The third cardinal principle of education is, in effect, an amplification of the first principle. All education must be under the direction of the Party. The Party determines the objectives of education, dictates the methods, supervises the whole process, and evaluates the results. In every school, the Party branch and the local unit of the Communist Youth League hold special positions of power and authority. Party representatives keep an especially close eye on political education and the "ideological consciousness" of each student and faculty member. Their word is virtually law. They control teacher appointment (or dismissal) as well as student advancement. Until recent years, it was a common practice to keep a non-Communist school principal and to install a Party member as vice principal, who was recognized as the real authority in

the school. Now, in the new schools established in recent years, the principals are usually Party members.

MASS EDUCATION

Mass education is of capital importance because education is the only sure way of securing the compliance and support of the masses. A basic task of mass education is to reduce illiteracy. To direct the thought and action of the masses, the state bombards the population with a constant barrage of instructions, explanations, appeals, and messages of all kinds. Obviously, it is easier to reach literate people than a population unable to read posters, slogans, and indoctrination leaflets.

In 1955, Mao Tse-tung issued a call for the elimination of illiteracy in five to seven years. In a 1959 conference on anti-illiteracy work, it was reported that 100 million people had attended literacy classes and half of them could be considered as having passed the stage of illiteracy. A 1960 report claimed that 70 million people had been freed from illiteracy in the two preceding years. More progress has been made in the cities than in the rural areas. Priority is given to workers as a class, among whom the percentage of literacy has reached a higher level than among the peasants. The *People's Daily* reported in 1960 that illiteracy among workers had dropped from 80 per cent (in 1949) to 20 per cent.

No doubt, much progress has been made. At the same time, it is not possible to tell definitely how much illiteracy remains in China today. Statistical reports vary, and the variations warn us that the published figures are far from accurate. We read reports that in certain areas, "most" of the workers have attained "basic literacy," but we do not find a clear definition of what constitutes "basic literacy." Moreover, the optimistic reports are limited to certain areas or certain trades and should not be taken as indicative of the national picture.

Another difficulty is that there is a tendency for persons who attain "basic literacy" to slide back into illiteracy or semi-illiteracy.

TABLE IV:

Proportion of Students of Worker and Peasant Origin to Total Number of Students
(Published by the Communist State Statistical Bureau)
(percentage of total in each category)

Year	Institutes of higher learning	Technical middle schools	Middle schools	Primary schools and Kindergartens
1951	19.1	56.6	51.3	
1952	20.5	57.1	56.1	
1953	21.9	55.9	57.7	
1954	...	58.8	60.7	
1955	29.0	62.0	62.2	
1956	34.1	64.1	66.0	
1957	36.3	66.6	69.1	
1958	48.0*	77.0	75.2	90.0

* Among new students of 1958, 62%.

The Communists have encouraged methods of "rapid learning" which enable illiterates to learn basic written characters within a short time. It has been found, however, that what is quickly learned can be easily forgotten, and there are no published figures on the percentage of those who slip back into illiteracy. The tendency to forget what is learned in the literacy classes and anti-illiteracy campaigns is exacerbated by the lack of follow-up instruction and the shortage of reading material geared to the level of new literates. Some attempt has been made to produce reading material using the simple vocabulary of the literacy classes, but the product is as yet extremely meager and inadequate.

Mass education is in large measure the education of workers and peasants. Workers and peasants are accorded a high rating in the Communist ideological scale, and people of "worker-peasant class origin" are considered to be far better material for the revolution than those of bourgeois class origin. The most trusted cadres are those of worker-peasant origin.

The trouble is that it is difficult to expect leadership from a class in which illiteracy is high. Moreover, workers and peasants constitute the main production force, and they cannot be very efficient in learning production techniques when they are illiterate. Consequently, the Communists have paid special attention to worker-peasant education.

Special schools have been established for the benefit of adult workers and peasants. They range from literacy classes to technical schools and "short-term" schools which enable workers and peasants to cover the equivalent of elementary and secondary education by attending evening classes for a few years, thereby preparing them for admission into post-secondary institutions, even into universities. In the regular schools and colleges, a major policy is to give preference to applicants for admission from worker-peasant families. This policy has resulted in a steady increase in the percentage of worker-peasant students in regular schools and colleges. This increase is proudly hailed not only as an extension of educational opportunity to admit those normally deprived of education in "bourgeois society" but also as a significant advance toward the development of a "proletarian intelligentsia." The increase of worker-peasant students is shown in Table IV.

LANGUAGE REFORM

An important question in mass education is that of language reform. The Chinese written language is difficult and has been considered a major obstacle to universal education. The idea of language reform is not new in China. Attempts to simplify the writing and to introduce some form of phonetic symbols have been made throughout China's long history. Definite progress has

been made in the second and third quarter of the twentieth century.

THREE PHASES

Since 1949, the Communists have pushed the reform vigorously and have brought about radical changes that make it easier for beginners to learn the written language. There are three major phases of the language reform: (1) the unification of pronunciation, (2) the simplification of written characters, and (3) the adoption of phonetic symbols.

The unification of the Chinese spoken language had already met with signal success under the Nationalist regime. In areas of diverse dialects, schools in the 1930's were required to teach children to read and speak the "Kuo Yü," literally "National Speech." The standard of pronunciation was the Peking dialect, or what is popularly known in this country as "Mandarin." While local accents and variations were inevitable, China was fast approaching a unity of spoken language that enabled people from all parts of the country to converse with one another. Radio broadcasting in Kuo Yü and increased travel as a result of better transportation facilities helped to bring about the change.

The Communists have continued this phase of the language reform, still using the Peking pronunciation as a model. It is fair to say that this phase of the reform will be achieved without serious difficulty.

Much has been done to simplify the written language. Many characters with complicated component strokes have been simplified by the reduction of strokes; and the new "abbreviated writing" is used in newspapers, books and all other publications. Lists of these characters have been issued officially.

Some of the abbreviated forms have been popularly used for decades and centuries, but they were rarely used in printing. They are, however, familiar to any Chinese brought up under pre-Communist education. In addition, the Communist government has introduced completely new abbreviations which a Chinese in Taiwan would not be able to read. The simplified characters are

easier to write and easier to learn. They have replaced the more complicated forms.

The third phase of the language reform is the adoption of phonetic symbols. A system of phonetic symbols was in vogue before 1949 and is still used in Taiwan today. But the Communist plan of phoneticization represents a radical departure from previous proposals. The Communists use the Western alphabet. Moreover, they are in favor of the eventual replacement of the written characters by the new alphabetized script, leaving the characters to the few scholars engaged in research. They call this the "Latinization" of the Chinese language.

An alphabet has been officially adopted. It is essentially the Roman alphabet, with some modifications to fit peculiarly Chinese sounds. This phase of the reform has aroused much discussion and some opposition. Scholars have been skeptical of the abolition of written characters for fear of losing China's vast cultural heritage represented by the literary works preserved through the centuries in the written characters. In deference to the views of scholars, the Communists are now holding in abeyance their plan to abolish the written characters, but they still maintain that a thorough language reform must eventually enable the masses to read and write without learning the written characters.

At the present time, the phonetic symbols are used to aid the learning of the simplified written characters. The symbols are either put beside the characters to indicate the pronunciation, or taught by themselves before the characters are introduced. Many advantages are claimed for the phonetic symbols. It is said that they enable learners to pronounce more accurately and learn the written characters more quickly. And, although progress is slower than in the other two phases of the language reform, the government is sparing no effort to popularize the new alphabet.

SPARE-TIME EDUCATION

The main vehicle for mass education is spare-time education. There are numerous

TABLE V:

Number of People Attending Spare-Time Schools and Number of Those Newly Literate

Year	Spare-time institute of higher learning	Spare-time technical middle schools	Spare-time middle schools	Spare-time primary schools	Newly literate
1949	.100	.100	657,000
1950	.400	.100	1,372,000
1951	1,600	.300	1,375,000
1952	4,100	.700	249,000	1,375,000	656,000
1953	9,700	1,100	404,000	1,523,000	2,954,000
1954	13,200	186,000	760,000	2,088,000	2,637,000
1955	15,900	195,000	1,167,000	4,538,000	3,678,000
1956	63,800	563,000	2,236,000	5,195,000	7,434,000
1957	75,900	588,000	2,714,000	6,267,000	7,208,000
1958	150,000	...	5,000,000	26,000,000	40,000,000

types of spare-time schools: literacy classes, primary schools, middle schools, technical schools, normal schools, teachers' institutes, even advanced schools known as "colleges" or "universities." Classes are held after work hours in order that there be no interference with production activities. Table V, furnished by the State Statistical Bureau of the Communist government, shows the increase in enrollment in spare-time education up to 1958.

Factories, farms, business firms, government offices, even the steamers on the Yangtze, are urged to organize spare-time "schools" for their employees. Peasants enroll in "spare-time" education in their off seasons. It is claimed that work experience, general maturity and a strong motivation enable adult learners to attain the equivalent of full-time education in less time. The equivalent, however, is stated in terms of minimum essentials and such specifics as the number of characters learned. Those who go on to the regular schools have been found to be scholastically deficient, but the Communists at this time seem to be more concerned with quantity and with the class revolution as expressed in the growth of a proletarian intelligentsia than with the quality of the product.

Spare-time education is important for the elimination of illiteracy, for raising the technical competence of workers and peasants, for the training of teachers and the many types

of personnel needed in national reconstruction. It plays an important role in the training of cadres, who are for the most part chosen for their "revolutionary fervor" rather than for their competence. They are, therefore, encouraged to make up for their deficiency in schooling by spare-time study. Besides, in the collective society of the Communists, it is a good policy to keep the people occupied all the time. By urging people to use their "spare time" for education, which of course includes politics, the Communists make sure that people do not have time for "free activities" or the personal pleasures that characterize bourgeois living. All waking hours after work must be used for self-betterment in revolutionary work.

The terms "elementary," "secondary," and "higher" schools as used in spare-time education must be understood to be relative terms only. Many of the spare-time "colleges" and "universities" are at best secondary schools in standard. The *Peking People's Daily* reported in 1964 the existence of 34 spare-time institutions of higher learning and 29 spare-time technical schools in Shanghai. Most of these were evening schools attached to the full-time colleges and universities. They enrolled 24,000 students, engaged in the study of agriculture, engineering, medicine, finance and economics, teacher training, and other subjects. Many students in these "higher institutions" were

reported to have been illiterate in 1949 and had climbed the educational ladder by spare-time education.

There is no doubt that many poor people who in previous years might have remained illiterate all their lives are being enabled to better themselves today through education and the acquisition of knowledge and skills useful in vocations. The implications of this development for the new society the Communist aim to build require no elaboration.

There are many forms of spare-time education. Correspondence schools offer graded courses providing training in a variety of vocations. Lists of courses include mathematics, meteorology, accounting, factory management, logic, engineering and so forth. The Chinese People's University and the Kirin Teachers University, two pioneers in correspondence courses, claim to have trained "at least 10,000 specialists in economics, finance, political science and factory management as well as over 3,000 middle school teachers."

Another new form of spare-time education is the TV University. Students gather at designated centers to listen to the broadcasts and then study by themselves. In the first year of the experiment in 1960, the Shanghai TV University claimed to have 26,000 enrollees. The TV University in Peking reported 35,000 students in 1962; it maintains some 1,000 receiving centers in the city where workers, government employees, soldiers, commune functionaries, and school teachers go for their lessons. Besides regular courses on the "college level," there are also college preparatory courses for secondary school students. Students are provided with self-study guides, exercises and question sheets. The natural sciences predominate in the course offerings.

MASS MEDIA

No discussion of education in Communist China should fail to mention the educational function of a diversity of mass media outside the schools. The radio, the press, the drama, the motion picture, the performing arts, the museums, many kinds of exhibits and public

celebrations—all of these share the task of remolding the thought and action of China's millions.

Reading newspapers is a civic duty; so is listening to the radio or going to a drama. The purpose is not pleasure or entertainment, but correct information and education. Newspaper-reading groups and radio-listening groups are organized in schools, offices, hospitals, factories, farms, and so forth, and participation is expected of all.

The Communists speak of a vast "cultural network" that reaches "every corner of the commune." In order to perform their educational duty, writers, artists, editors and motion picture directors must themselves be remolded so that their products may be ideologically sound.

The new citizen must be ideologically correct and a competent "Red expert," a brave warrior for the class struggle and an efficient worker on the production front. In April, 1965, a women's ping-pong team from Communist China won a championship in a table tennis tournament in Yugoslavia. Hailing the victory, the Chinese Communist press and radio took pains to point out that the team had won because its members had in their training studied the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung"; having been ideologically oriented, they easily became champion players. They are true examples of the new socialist man. What is true of ping-pong players is equally true of the worker, the miner, the school teacher, the scientist, the physician, the engineer. Each must be an expert in his field, but above all each must be "Red." Politics and education are inseparable.

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Improvements in the Chinese economic picture are analyzed by this economist, who nonetheless warns that "There is every evidence that the bottlenecks that limit the rate of growth of the Chinese economy are still present in very large measure."

Communist China's Economy: Critical Questions

By YUAN-LI WU

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TO THE STUDENT of Chinese affairs, the economic position of mainland China and its outlook at this time present a number of puzzling aspects. While some of the perplexities are the result of inadequate information, they are not entirely so. To a certain degree, there are serious uncertainties which may confront the Communist planners themselves as well as outside observers. There are difficult problems which cannot be readily clarified or obviated short of dramatic changes in the economic parameters with which Communist China must deal and in the ideology of the Chinese planning authorities which they apparently would be reluctant to abandon.

Indications of positive improvements in the country's economic conditions and general outlook in 1964 and 1965 are not lacking. Through his more recent official pronouncements and interviews Chou En-lai for instance, has provided us with a number of general statistics and related statements which point to such an advance. Thus, in his 1964 year-end report, he claimed that the gross

value of industrial output during the year was 15 per cent higher than that of 1963, and that agricultural production had exceeded the 1963 level in the case of a number of commodities. Furthermore, it was reported through Edgar Snow that grain production in mainland China in 1964 was 200 million metric tons; chemical fertilizers, 7 million tons; steel, 13 million tons; the expected 1965 output of petroleum, 10 million tons.¹ Still other favorable indicators may be pointed out, such as the report that all outstanding indebtedness to the Soviet Union has been repaid; the common observation of most recent visitors to mainland China that there has been some relaxation of the very strict commodity rations; and the noticeably renewed vigorous push of Chinese exports and imports, especially in trading with certain Western countries. In the latter connection, one could also recall the boast which has been voiced for some time that Communist China would soon be more than self-sufficient in the supply of petroleum which hitherto constituted a serious bottleneck in Chinese economic development and simultaneously put Communist China at a great disadvantage in her dispute with the Soviet Union.²

Postponing any discussion of the accuracy of the above selective claims for the moment, we should perhaps emphasize two major

¹ Based on Snow's interview with Chou En-lai as reported by Yagi, a Japanese reporter who talked with Snow in Geneva in early 1965.

² Reference may be made to the fact that the Soviet Union at one time during the Sino-Soviet dispute offered to renew technical assistance in petroleum engineering in spite of her earlier wholesale withdrawal of specialist assistance in 1960.

points—viz., the statement by Chou that the third Five Year Plan would begin in 1966, since the task of “readjusting the national economy,” undertaken since 1961, had been “basically accomplished,” and the two successful detonations of nuclear devices by Peking in October, 1964, and May, 1965, respectively. From the economic point of view, the planned resumption of long-term planning which had been quietly abandoned after 1961 would seem to indicate a resurgence of confidence, as well as the recovery of the economy to a point where the ravages of the preceding sharp recession have already been repaired. The nuclear detonations in turn demonstrated both the level of Chinese capability in science and the presence of some degree of sophistication in technology and engineering.

These are conditions that might be taken to be indicative of the potential offered by Chinese research and development activities if sufficient support and push are given to them. Furthermore, it is now obvious that the buildup preceding the first nuclear test was carried out during a period of severe economic stringency. One might, therefore, be tempted to infer that the economy of mainland China possessed sufficient versatility and that it would be capable of renewed economic growth and the simultaneous pursuit of an expanded nuclear weapons program. Such an inference would clearly have its political consequences. One might even speculate that a new “leap forward” would not be entirely out of the question.

THE QUESTIONABLE CLAIMS

So far, we have limited ourselves to a review of some of the principal positive elements from the point of view of Communist China. Further scrutiny, however, raises a number of disquieting questions. In the first place, grain production in 1964 has been

variously estimated at 181–183 million tons—still substantially below the indirectly reported figure of 200 million tons attributed to Snow and ultimately to Chou En-lai.³ One suspects that the 200-million-ton estimate may actually constitute a grossly rounded figure. By the same token, one may question the reported production figures for chemical fertilizers, steel and petroleum. Estimates made in Hong Kong, on the other hand, show much lower figures for 1964: chemical fertilizers, 3.4–3.6 million tons instead of 7 million tons; crude steel, 8–10 million tons instead of 13 million tons; petroleum, 6–7 million tons in 1964 in contrast to the 10 million tons reportedly planned for 1965.⁴ Some observers in Taiwan have suggested that the discrepancy between the 7 million tons of chemical fertilizer production reported through Snow and the lower estimate of about 3.5 million tons should be attributed either to a confusion of the concept of total availability with that of domestic production or to the employment of certain gross figures in reporting output.⁵

In short, the lack of precision in the figures attributed to the Snow interview substantially detracts from one's confidence in the higher claims. As for petroleum, there are some reports that production, especially from the new fields in the area of Ta-lai, Ch'ing-ch'eng and An-ta in Northern Manchuria (generally described as the Ta-ch'ing oil fields) has probably not been so large as it was hoped for at first. It is significant that Chou En-lai has stated that the planned increase in industrial output in 1965 was to be no more than 11 per cent over the 1964 level. While such a modest plan might denote extreme prudence, it also seemed to be somewhat out of place unless there were greater obstacles than the rosy official pronouncements have revealed.

The last point raises a methodological question about the meaning of full economic recovery. Clearly, recovery should not simply mean the restoration of the production of certain commodities to levels that had been previously reached before the sharp recession in 1961, inasmuch as the mere attainment of these levels in the past was not sufficient to guarantee the continuation of an upward

³ See, for instance, “Decision for an Upsurge,” *Current Scene*, Vol. III, No. 17, Hong Kong, April 15, 1965, p. 9. The estimate of 181 million tons is derived from a Japanese source.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Derived from personal interviews in Taiwan and Japan.

trend. There existed before the "great slide" certain inherent difficulties which first triggered the "upper turning point" and subsequently aggravated the decline. Accordingly, full economic recovery must mean the removal, either entirely or in very large measure, of those causes which existed in 1960-1961. A mere comparison of production levels for a few selected items is insufficient.

As for the economic meaning of the successful nuclear detonations, while one should not deny the scientific prowess and technological competence of Communist China, one could just as well interpret the recent detonations in a less favorable light. First, while the nuclear detonations may be indicative of the degree of success that is possible if sufficient effort is concentrated in a preselected direction, one may question the extent to which this particular concentration of research and development activities may have diverted expenditure and scientific and engineering manpower from other more peaceful pursuits. To measure the effect of such a diversion of resources would be no mean task, but there can be little doubt that a diversion must have taken place.⁶ Secondly, even if the simultaneous pursuit of economic recovery and the development of nuclear weaponry are indicative of the versatility of the Chinese economy, some observers would argue that recovery has in fact been delayed by the diversion of resources to the nuclear program, not the least important aspect of which may have been the diversion of a substantial portion of electricity from possible industrial use to the concentration of U-235 in the gaseous diffusion plant.

There is the additional question concerning the scale of China's forthcoming nuclear program. A related question focuses on all the costs of a delivery system, which according

to some observers has already been carried on simultaneously with the development of the nuclear device itself, but which has as yet to begin production on a sizable scale. Would the development of the delivery system and the production of nuclear warheads be a substantial burden on the economy? Clearly, these are questions which must hang heavily on the minds of Communist China's economic planners no less than they may interest many observers in the West. Herein rests a major uncertainty in Chinese economic and political prospects.

BALANCED DEVELOPMENT

The ability of the Chinese economy to bear the burden of a sizable and possibly expanded nuclear weapons program depends, *inter alia*, upon the size of the Chinese G.N.P., its rate of growth, and its commodity composition. Thus, principal determinants are still the extent of current economic recovery in various sectors and the removal of the causes of the previous downturn. Reference may be made in this connection to an article by Fang Chung in the March 13, 1964, issue of the *Peking Review* where the author complained about the uneven rates of development in productive capacity during 1958-1960 in various branches of industry:

This caused certain discrepancies between industries producing raw and other materials and processing industries, between extractive and metallurgical industries; and between heavy and light industries. Again, as some branches of industries were built and industrial output grew rapidly, certain products failed to maintain a stable level of quality.⁷

While the explanation offered by Fang Chung for the downturn of the economy stressed imbalance in the planning of investment, aggravated by the poor quality of products, one might add as an equally important contributing factor unbalanced sectorial development in disregard of the economic plan. The all-out push for steel production and the drive to establish small industrial establishments in an artificially stimulated atmosphere of inter-plant competition in fact gave rise to much of the poor quality in the products that were

⁶ There is a report that 342 Chinese scientists and engineers were assigned to the nuclear development program in 1958 and that a total of 1,100 had been trained in the Soviet Union for the same purpose up to the Sino-Soviet rupture in 1960. See Hayakawa, *Chûkyô no Genshiryoku riyô ni Kansuru Kenkyû* (Research on the Use of Atomic Energy), K.D.K. Series, No. 5, 1964.

⁷ See Fang Chung's article referred to in the text, p. 7.

brought forth. Furthermore, there was, of course, the shock suffered by the industrial sector from the abrupt and peremptory withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance, totalling 1,390 specialists and affecting 343 contracts and 257 items of scientific and technical co-operation between Communist China and the Soviet Union.⁸

The measures adopted in the official policy of "readjustment and consolidation" consisted of steps designed especially to reduce the future susceptibility of the Chinese economy to such shocks and to remove the bottlenecks which produced the sectorial shortages. And, the record shows a measure of success.

Thus, the chemical fertilizer industry has received considerable attention. According to one study⁹ there are at present some 70 modern chemical fertilizer enterprises, and, by October, 1964, the annual productive capacity of all plants which have an individual annual capacity exceeding 10,000 tons probably came to 3,790,000 tons. If we were to add to the above another 30,000 tons which are attributed to six smaller enterprises, the total capacity would be 3,820,000 tons a year. Not counting the capacity of some smaller plants as well as that of some plants on which information is unreliable or incomplete, especially with respect to the status of completion of expansion plans, it is entirely possible that the total productive capacity of chemical fertilizers is now at the level of 4 million tons. This is entirely in line with the production estimates cited earlier. To this we should add the annual imports in order to arrive at total supply. The same source gives imports from West Germany, France, Japan and Hong Kong in 1963 as 1,152,000 tons and, for 1964, a possible 1,200,000 tons from Japan alone.

⁸ Fang Chung, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁹ Hsiao Chi-jung, "The Production and Supply of Chemical Fertilizers in Communist China," *Wen-i Yü Yen-chiu* (Problems and Research), Vol. 4, No. 5, Taiwan, February 10, 1965.

¹⁰ Ch'ien Yuan-heng, "The Machine Tool Industry of Communist China," *Fei-ch'ing Yen-chiu* (Studies on Communist China), Vol. 7, No. 9, Taiwan, Sept. 30, 1964.

¹¹ Yuan-li Wu, *et. al.*, *The Economic Potential of Communist China, Vol. III* (Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, 1964.).

A second bottleneck which the Chinese planners have attempted assiduously to remove is in the machine tools industry. According to a recent report, the present annual production may be estimated at around 30,000 units in 600 different categories of machine tools. These are said to be produced in some 23 medium-sized or larger plants which constitute a fairly well integrated machine tools industry.¹⁰ Furthermore, it is known that a fair sized and geographically widely dispersed system of machine repair plants has been set up during the last few years. The latter development has especially had the effect of increasing the effectiveness of farm machinery by keeping the tractors, and other equipment in better repair. Some 100 types of machine tools are said to be among Communist China's exports. If the reports of some Japanese observers who have viewed the machines exhibited in Japan are to be believed, high quality was discernible in 28 types, some of which were not yet produced in Japan, and the technological level demonstrated by these machines was impressive.

However, while the rigidity of these bottlenecks is being reduced, it is far too early to assert that they no longer exercise any constraint on Communist China's economic development. The same study on the machine tool industry cited above points to the heavy incidence of accidents, poor maintenance work, lack of skilled workers, and a continued inadequacy in design in spite of the larger number of new types being produced experimentally. The chemical fertilizer industry, in spite of its rapid advance, is also far from being self-sufficient. The total output of food grain in 1964, if it is at the estimated level of about 183 million tons, would in fact approximate the trend value which the present author has estimated for 1964 elsewhere.¹¹ Since this trend value is derived on the basis of production in a normal year without any radical change in agricultural technology, and since it is below the minimum requirement to feed the population of mainland China, this state of chronically deficient supply explains the continued import of food

grains for the present and points to the need for a much greater expansion of the fertilizer industry. Nor should one disregard the complementary need for an adequate distribution and transportation system which would enable the farmers to receive the supplies that are available. There is every evidence that the bottlenecks that limit the rate of growth of the Chinese economy are still present in very large measure.

THE MEANING OF "SELF-RELIANCE"

According to Fang Chung, during 1963 Communist China successfully trial-manufactured 400 to 500 new steel products and 700 new kinds of machines and equipment, including some large and high-precision types. During 1964 and 1965, Communist planners and party leaders have continued to stress the goal of self-reliance which simply means, in addition to the long-term goal of self-sufficiency, a deliberate effort to reduce the susceptibility of Communist China to such externally generated shocks as the sudden withdrawal of Soviet technicians and specialists in 1960.

Another measure which is aimed at the reduction of susceptibility to external shocks consists of the attempt to introduce artificial fibres as substitutes for cotton. The effort to purchase vinylon plants from Japan¹² is indicative of a dual purpose. First, to the extent that cotton growing can be reduced, more land would be made available for planting wheat. Secondly, substitution of artificial fibres for cotton would reduce the dependence of the textile industry on agricultural production or raw material import. Although the vinylon plants (the import of one of which from Japan has been blocked) intro-

duced so far can probably only make up the cotton deficiency rather than reduce the need for cotton growing, the policy of substituting raw materials of industrial origin for those of agricultural origin has had the purpose of reducing the susceptibility of the economy to shocks that might be attributed to the vagaries of nature.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONSTRAINT

Since the technological revolution in farming has not progressed very far, and since the sectorial bottlenecks are still present, the Chinese economy will continue to be susceptible to the disturbance of sectorial shortages, and the way out offered by imports will continue to be limited by the availability of foreign exchange. If there are priority imports represented by such commodities as food grains, chemical fertilizers and fertilizer plants, the ability to import other industrial products and equipment will depend upon the total amount of foreign exchange available. As long as domestic technology cannot free the economy from some degree of dependence on imports in certain crucial sectors, the balance of payments constraint will continue to be effective. In this connection, any import needed for an expanded nuclear weapons program will constitute an alternative demand for foreign exchange.

At the same time we see that, although the completion of the repayment of Soviet loans may have removed one source of demand for foreign exchange, the greater volume of trade with Western countries will necessitate a larger reserve in convertible currencies.¹³ Furthermore, there is the accumulated indebtedness due to grain imports that has to be settled. There has also been a continuing downward trend in the amount of overseas remittances sent to mainland China.¹⁴ The last factor has had the effect of reducing one of the historically more reliable sources of foreign exchange receipts in the Chinese balance of payments.

Depending upon the statistical series employed, one can derive varying estimates of the degree to which trade between Commu-

¹² See Dick Wilson, "China's Trading Prospects," *Fair Eastern Economic Review*, No. 86, Hong Kong, August 20, 1964.

¹³ Reference may be made at this point to the recently reported purchase by Communist China of substantial amounts of gold on the London market about which varying explanations have been offered. One of these explanations suggests that a larger working reserve is now needed by the Chinese state trading system and that the latter prefers to hold at least a part of the reserve in gold.

¹⁴ See Wu Ch'un-shi's monographic study on overseas Chinese remittances, prepared at the Hoover Institution.

nist China and Western countries has expanded in recent years. Estimates made in Hong Kong show Communist China's total trade (exports plus imports) with non-Communist countries in 1964 at \$1.95 billion against a total of \$1.06 billion with the Communist bloc. The relative shares were exactly reversed in 1957.¹⁵ But if grain imports from the West and Chinese exports to Hong Kong and Malaysia were excluded, as the author has shown elsewhere,¹⁶ the reorientation of trade away from the Bloc would be much less. Without even considering recent indications that the volume of Sino-Soviet trade may have stopped its declining trend of the past few years, the limited capability of exporting to countries outside the special markets represented by Hong Kong and Malaysia, which have predominantly Chinese populations, suggests certain severe limits to the continued expansion of total Chinese exports. Neither the recovery of Communist China's external trade nor its reorientation in the early 1960's should therefore be interpreted as the removal of the balance of payments constraint to economic growth. If imports for an expanded nuclear weapons program were imposed on the existing situation, it is difficult to see how the ability to import for renewed economic development would not be significantly affected.

CRUCIAL IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

In the circumstances, it would be too optimistic even for the Communist planners to believe that sustained economic growth could be safeguarded in spite of an expanded nuclear weapons program conducted on a respectable scale. The prospects of sustained economic development would be darkened if there are again agricultural failures.

The prospects for sustained economic growth free from violent fluctuations would also be adversely affected if there is any tendency toward an acceleration of the

planned rate of growth. If the resumption of long-term planning in 1966 should be rewarded with initial success, the ideological predilection of the Communist planners to accelerate growth may again prove to be a fatal and inherent difficulty.

Lastly, the prospects for further economic growth would be reduced should Communist China blunder into a direct military confrontation with the United States over Vietnam. While such a development is clearly being avoided by the Communist Chinese authorities, one cannot exclude it entirely in view of the ever-present possibility that some of the Chinese leaders may have come to believe their own propaganda that the United States is a paper tiger and that their own nuclear capability is greater than it is.

Even if all these foregoing pitfalls are avoided, there remains the enigmatic and unpredictable factor represented by population growth. If the present natural rate of increase in the Chinese population stays at two per cent per annum, the drag exercised by population growth on economic development will remain substantial especially if food grain imports have to be continued at a high level and must be given priority over other imports.

If the preceding analysis fails to answer some of the questions which puzzle students of Chinese affairs, let us hope that it has at least succeeded in pointing to some of the critical issues upon which future judgments must be made. Only a watchful eye and continued vigilance can provide the kind of assessment of Communist China's capability and intentions which we so sorely need.

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¹⁵ See the *Current Scene* article quoted in Note 2 above, p. 10.

¹⁶ See the discussion on Communist China in the world economy in the author's forthcoming text, *The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

Although this specialist believes that, because of population growth, "per capita farm output in China today is undoubtedly much worse than it was in 1957," he emphasizes the fact that "... the limited freedom regained by the farmers has served as an important stimulus to increase production in recent years and has contributed to the economic recovery."

Agriculture in China Today

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ALL INFORMATION recently coming out of Communist China seems to indicate that the regime has cleared up the economic quagmire left by the "great leap forward" movement in 1958 and the disastrous effects of the three consecutive years of natural calamities thereafter. The Chinese press describes the economic situation in 1964 as an all-round upsurge in industrial and agricultural production. For the agricultural sector in particular, the harvest of last year was said to be a bumper crop. Based on these economic conditions, Chou En-lai, in his "Report on the Work of the Government" made in the first session of the Third National Congress, stated that the work of "readjustment, consolidation, filling out and raising the standards" had been basically accomplished by 1964.¹ He also officially announced that 1966 was scheduled as the initial year of the Third Five Year Plan.

¹ *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*), December 31, 1964.

² So far only one important grain-growing region (Kiangsu) has reported a 10 percent rise in grain production in 1964. See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, January 31, 1965.

³ The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the United Nations has estimated it at 190 million tons.

⁴ *Ta-kung-pao* (*Impartial Daily*), March 23, 1964.

⁵ *Ta-kung-pao*, March 4, 1965.

⁶ *Ibid.*

However, Chou En-lai did not cite any statistics in absolute terms to show the extent of success in 1964. Nor do other Chinese Communist sources. Observers in the West still have to depend on their estimates to determine where Communist China stands now economically.

As far as grain is concerned, Chou mentioned that output in 1964 surpassed the 1957 level. The official figure of grain output for 1957 was previously given as 185 million tons. Since this was the first time that the Chinese government had revealed openly the fact that the 1957 output level had been overtaken, we may reasonably assume that 1963 grain output was still below 185 million tons. It is unlikely that 1964 output could be 10 percent higher than the 1963 level.² Therefore, 1964 grain output was probably within the range of 190-195 million tons.³

The increases in economic crops in the last two years were more remarkable. A 50 percent rise in cotton output was claimed for 1963 as compared with the 1962 level.⁴ It was reportedly increased further by 37 percent in 1964, and the absolute quantity in that year was said to be higher than that in 1957.⁵ The same source also stated that output of cotton per unit of sown area in 1964 was an all-time high, but implied that the total sown area for cotton was still below the pre-1959 record.⁶ Total output of cotton

in 1964 may be put at about 1.8 million tons or 160,000 tons more than the 1957 level.

Economic crops such as cotton suffered the sharpest decline in 1960–1961. Prior to that period, some districts had developed as exclusively cotton growing areas in which people sold their produce to the government and in turn bought grain from the grain distribution organizations of the government. However, owing to the general shortage of grain during the crisis years, people in those areas were confronted with serious difficulties of acquiring grain this way. Consequently, they switched most of their land to grow grain in order to achieve self-sufficiency.

This change not only brought about a drastic reduction in the total acreage of cotton land but also lowered cotton output per unit of land because each production team (the basic production unit in rural areas during this period) kept only one or several small parcels of land for growing cotton, divisions unsuitable for farm machines and the application of chemical fertilizer and insecticide. Beginning in 1962, the total acreage of cotton land gradually increased as the supply of grain improved. In the meantime, the government urged the production units to adjust their land utilization so that the small fragmentary plots of cotton land could be converted into larger blocks.⁷

The economy of scale has been achieved to some extent through this rearrangement of farm land. It is also true that the cotton growing regions have received in the last two years relatively more support from the government in the form of increased supply of farm machines and chemical fertilizer.⁸ According to the official report for 1964, the total acreage of cotton land was enlarged by 11.4 per cent and output per unit of land rose by 23 per cent.⁹

Sugar cane and beets, which are less im-

portant economically than cotton and production of which concentrates in only a few provinces such as Fuchien and Kwangtung, are the crops that have shown the largest increase in recent years. The harvest in the 1963–1964 crop period was claimed to have exceeded the all-time high and that in the 1964–1965 crop period was even higher than the preceding year's record. As a result, in these two years the sugar manufacturing industry in China had to prolong the extraction periods beyond the normal length of time by about one month.¹⁰

Although the data recently received from Communist China is meager by any standard, it is highly precious to us after a long period of economic information blackout by the Chinese Communist government. These statistics shed some light on several significant aspects. First of all, they can tell approximately where Communist China stands now economically. As far as agricultural production is concerned, the current output is only slightly better than the 1957 level. However, since the population has grown over the period of eight years, per capita farm output in China today is undoubtedly much worse than it was in 1957.

Second, they indicate how low the Chinese economy had sunk in the crisis period for which no information has been directly disclosed. If we take our estimated figures of output for 1964 and the rates of increase officially announced for 1963 and 1964, the annual production in 1961–1962 would probably have the following order of magnitudes—grain: 150–160 million tons; cotton: .8–.9 million tons.

Last, but perhaps most interesting, the recent information can show really how great was the “great leap forward” in 1958 and 1959. The Chinese newspapers save no effort to propagandize the bumper crop of 1964. In practically every region in China the weather was unusually favorable and the harvest was reported excellent. A great many local cadres have expressed their feeling that agricultural production has already reached its physical ceiling under the present technical conditions. Further increase is con-

⁷ *Chung-kuo Nung-pao* (*Journal of China's Agriculture*) No. 3, 1965, p. 31 and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 4, 1965.

⁸ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, September 22, 1964.

⁹ *Ta-kung-pao*, March 4, 1965.

¹⁰ *Chung-kuo Hsin-wen* (*China News*), January 21, 1965 and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 11, 1965.

TABLE 1: MODERNIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1957-1964)

	Number of Tractors in Use (Standard sets of 15 HP)	Total Consumption of Chemical Fertilizer (1,000 tons)	Total Capacity of Irrigation and Drainage Equipment (1,000 HP)	Total Electric Power Consumption in Rural Areas (million Kwh)
1957	24,629	2,180	—	76
1958	45,330	3,260	1,600	—
1959	59,000	2,830	3,380	—
1960	83,800	3,130	5,900	—
1961	99,000	2,620	6,680	—
1962	100,000	3,488	—	1,000
1963	113,000	5,370	9,000	1,300
1964	123,000	6,550	—	1,750

sidered humanly impossible.¹¹ The Party Central in Peking recently held a succession of meetings, with representatives from all over the country participating, to prepare for a new and higher "upsurge" in agricultural production. These meetings were partly aimed at removing the "erroneous thought" of local cadres that the maximum output had already been reached. They were told in these meetings that the ceiling could be raised by strenuous efforts.

To us, the relevant and interesting point is the following: There is no doubt that technical conditions of agricultural production were better in 1964 than in 1958. If 1964 output is regarded by so many people on the spot as the maximum that can be possibly achieved, 1958 output in all likelihood could never have been too much above the 1964 level. Therefore, the actual grain output in 1958 was probably no more than 200 million tons, which was only 53 per cent of the originally claimed achievement of 375 million tons for that year and was 50 million tons short of the subsequently revised figure. The actual output of grain in 1959 was probably less than 200 million tons because the Communist authorities openly admitted that "severe natural disasters" occurred in that year.

With the new priority given to agriculture during the period of economic readjustment, the whole country was urged to support farm

production. The main target was to obtain stable and high yield in this sector through the so-called "four modernizations," namely, mechanization, fertilization, irrigation and electrification. As shown in Table I, some progress has been made. The data in this table is either directly given by or calculated from various Chinese official sources.

MECHANIZATION

In the process of carrying out the program, different and changing weights have been placed on its four phases; and some are more successful than the others. Up to 1962, mechanization was a favored approach to modernization of China's agriculture. The total number of tractors in use rose rapidly in that period. However, the Communist planners soon realized that mechanization had rather limited effects on both stabilizing and raising farm output. In years when climatic conditions are abnormal, tractors render no help to the ability of farmland to resist natural calamities. Even when the weather is good, the use of farm machines does not directly lead to any appreciable increase in output per unit of land.

The chief contribution of mechanization is to save labor to be spent on a given amount of land. Unfortunately, labor in China is the production factor for which there is the least urgent need to plan. The benefit, if any, comes indirectly. That is, the labor so saved may be used to strengthen other labor-intensive types of work in the field, such as

¹¹ *Jen-min Jih pao*, January 30 and 31, February 20, 1965.

seed-selecting and weeding, which will result in some increase in output. Some Chinese economists have cited empirical data to show that the large capital investment for tractors and the expensive fuels for them make the use of them uneconomical.

The whole issue of mechanization is further complicated by various technical problems.¹² For instance, a large proportion of farmland in China lies not in the plains but in the hilly areas; and the average size of plots, generally determined by the terrain, is too small to warrant the effective operation of tractors. Furthermore, the most important type of cultivated land in China is rice paddies with a soft muddy bottom, in which ordinary tractors are utterly inoperative. Yet, up to now no machines specially designed for tilling rice paddies have proven successful.

Based on these considerations, Communist China began in 1963 to slow down the process of mechanization in the agricultural sector. Most existing tractors are used in the large-size cotton and wheat fields in the plain areas and on state farms which are mostly located in regions with sparse population.

Theoretically, an expanded irrigation system in China could be an effective and suitable approach to stabilizing and raising farm output. With a well-developed irrigation system, moderate droughts and waterlogging can be prevented and farm production can be made more or less independent of the vicissitude of weather conditions. The development of irrigation networks can also convert a low-yield land into a high-yield area. Unfortunately, irrigation and water control construction in the "great leap forward" period turned out to be a complete fiasco and had disastrous impact on China's agricultural production. In 1958, with the new shift in emphasis of water conservation construction from flood-control to storing

water, the government mobilized more than 100 million peasants to build a great number of reservoirs and canals throughout the country. Most of those water storage projects and irrigation systems were constructed without adequate surveys or proper designs. They were usually not accompanied by adequate drainage systems. Thus, the underground water level in neighboring areas was raised above its critical point, turning good soil into alkaline or swampy land. The excessive amount of water stored also rendered the country more vulnerable to floods in case of abnormally heavy rainfall. In fact, this was a factor as important as natural calamities in causing the drastic decline in farm output in the ensuing years.

Although the Communist leaders never openly admitted their mistakes in these aspects, the experience was nevertheless too bitter to be forgotten. For several years after 1959, the Chinese Communists practically ceased to build new water conservation projects. All they did was to improve the existing irrigation systems and to minimize their damaging effects on farm production. Even today, 40 per cent of the large and medium water conservation projects in the whole country do not function properly.¹³ It was only in the winter of 1963-1964 that large-scale construction of water conservation projects was resumed.¹⁴

Another shortcoming found in the projects previously constructed is that they all utilize the gravity supply of water as the means of irrigating land. This type of irrigation is relatively uneconomical because the water distribution system (canals and ditches) occupies a great amount of land. In 1958 alone, about 10 million acres or 3.6 per cent of the total cultivated land in China was used for this purpose. In view of the small arable land-man ratio in China, this factor is extremely important. New emphasis has therefore been given to the development of a type of irrigation system with a pumped supply of water. A pumping well can extract water at the point where it is needed in a large groundwater basin, thus saving the amount of land once used for building water

¹² *Ching-chi Yen-chiu* (Economic Research), No. 1, 1964, pp. 1-7 and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 2, 1963.

¹³ *Joint Publications and Research Service*, 30123, May 18, 1965, p. 45.

¹⁴ *Chung-kuo Hsin-wen*, Jan. 10, 1965.

courses and field channels.¹⁵ Furthermore, unlike the natural stream flow which suffers seasonal variations and depends heavily on rainfalls, the utilization of groundwater can meet the need for water more effectively in cases of abnormally low rainfall.

As a result of this new policy, the number of deep wells and other water-pumping installations has sharply increased in the last two years. The rising importance of electrically powered pumps is also reflected in the recent rapid growth in electric power consumption in the rural areas.

In contrast to the process of mechanization, the total amount of chemical fertilizer applied did not increase significantly until 1963. Economists in mainland China agree that, under the present conditions, the application of fertilizer is a surer way to raise farm output. The trouble lies, however, on the supply side. The domestic production capacity of chemical fertilizer has been limited and the government has been financially unable to afford to import it in large quantities every year. It was only after 1962, when several new plants were completed and put into operation, that China began to supply a rapidly increasing amount of chemical fertilizer to the countryside.

MODEL FARMS

In order to promote and disseminate modern farming techniques, in 1963 the government initiated numerous "model farms" throughout the country. The total area of these model farms is said to have reached 1.6 million acres, with millions of workers, cadres and agricultural scientists working side by side on them.¹⁶ Each model farm is a show-window through which peasants in the neighboring area may see and accept the usefulness of scientific knowledge about agricultural production. In addition to the model farms, there are also a great number of newly-formed farm technique promotion

centers and mobile teams consisting of agricultural specialists who are supposed to make visits to various communes to help the peasants solve technical problems on the spot.

In evaluating technological progress in China's agriculture and its effect on total farm output in the near future, one should, however, keep in mind the huge size of the country. Despite all the efforts and the results accomplished by the Chinese government, agricultural production is still far from stabilized. A bumper harvest did appear in 1964 primarily because of most favorable weather conditions. Any large-scale drought and flood in the near future are likely to bring down farm output substantially. To put it in quantitative terms, the average amount of chemical fertilizer applied to each acre of cultivated land in 1964 was only about 22 kg, which is one-twentieth of the annual quantity used per acre in Japan in the 1950's. To mechanize the whole agricultural sector in China, the need for tractors (one for every 250 acres) would amount to more than one million standard sets. The Communist Chinese planners are fully aware of this fact; their current policy is to concentrate most of the tractors and chemical fertilizer on a handful of strategic districts in the cotton and grain growing areas.

The Communist publications in China have been extremely careful not to mention the failure of the commune system. There have been organizational changes in the rural areas; yet people outside the bamboo curtain can hardly know when and how these changes have taken place and precisely what the present organization is. One can only detect some of the significant consequences of these changes by reading between lines in Chinese Communist newspapers and journals.

One obvious change is that the total number of communes in the countryside has risen from approximately 24,000 in 1958-1959 to somewhere about 74,000. This is a result of dividing the original communes into smaller ones presumably because of the desire to reduce the administrative difficulties associated with the giant size of the original communes.

More important is the fact that, ever since

¹⁵ It is estimated that the pumped supply of water, on the average, takes only one-fifteenth the land used in a gravity type supply of water. See *Ching-Chi Yen-chiu*, December 25, 1964.

¹⁶ *Chung-kuo Hsin-wen*, December 25, 1964.

the private plots were returned to farmers, farmers have paid increasingly more attention to their private plots than to the communal land. The intensity of cultivation on the private plots almost reaches the extreme. According to the documents captured by the Nationalists along the coast of mainland China, peasants in some communes (with their private plots accounting for only 5 per cent of total land) managed to produce 20 per cent of total farm output of those communes.¹⁷ As an inevitable development under these circumstances, peasants who are more diligent have become richer than those who are not.

Closely related to income distribution in communes, the distribution of farming implements among peasants has tended to be more and more unequal. Under the new system, as far as we can ascertain (except for large farm machines which belong to the production team or brigade or the commune as collectively owned properties), traditional implements and small tools have been redistributed to individual peasants as personal properties. According to one Communist report, only 8.1 per cent of the total number of implements and tools in the communes surveyed are collectively owned, while 91.9 per cent are personally owned.¹⁸ In terms of the degree of collective ownership, this system represents not a retreat from the original commune scheme to the "advanced co-operatives" which immediately preceded the commune system, but a retreat to the "primary-type cooperatives" prevailing in 1954-1955. In the last few years, well-to-do peasants have been able to save some money from their income, to acquire more and more farm implements, while poor peasants failed to do so. The number of implements owned by a farmer decisively determines his efficiency in farming, which in turn affects his income.

The income and wealth differential among farmers, which is incompatible with the Communist ideology, reached such a notable de-

gree in 1964 that the Party had to launch another class struggle in the rural areas. The peasants are classified into only three classes, namely, poor peasants, lower-middle peasants and middle peasants. There is no rich peasant class. The "struggle" is supposed to be carried out between the first two classes on the one side and the middle peasant class on the other. The Party's policy is to support and to rely on the poor and lower-middle class peasants.

The whole situation creates a serious dilemma for the Communist leadership. The stratification of peasants by income and wealth and their renewed capitalistic attitude are definitely undesirable from an ideological point of view. Therefore, Chou En-lai has condemned those who "advocate the extension of private plots and free markets and the fixing of output quotas with households as the basic units (i.e., the restoration of individual economy)."¹⁹

Yet, on the other hand, the top Communist leaders are clearly aware that the limited freedom regained by the farmers has served as an important stimulus to increase production in recent years and has contributed to the economic recovery. They recognize the risk should they recollectivize the agricultural sector. Even in the new "class struggle" in the countryside, well-to-do peasants are not treated as a hostile class. What the government is trying to accomplish at this moment is to impose on farmers some political pressure through the "class struggle" and the "socialist education movement," hoping that they may divert more of their energy and time from the private plots to the communal land.

Kang Chao has published several works on Communist China's economy including a book entitled *The Rate and Pattern of Industrial Growth of Communist China*; he is now engaged in research on the construction industry in Communist China. During the academic year 1965-1966, he will be a visiting instructor at the University of California at Berkeley.

¹⁷ *Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily)*, Taipei, January 7, 1965.

¹⁸ *Ta-kung-pao*, February 17, 1965.

¹⁹ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, December 31, 1964.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON CHINA AND EAST ASIA

EAST ASIA: THE MODERN TRANSFORMATION. (A History of East Asian Civilization, Volume II). BY JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EDWIN O. REISCHAUER AND ALBERT M. CRAIG. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. 955 pages, bibliographical suggestions, maps, charts, tables, index, \$10.75.)

East Asia, the second volume in a survey of East Asian civilization, grew out of the collaboration of the authors in a lecture course which was begun in 1939 and which has been offered since 1947 under the Harvard Program in Generation Education. The major part of volume II (chapters 1-2, 5-6, 8-9 and part of 10) is the work of J. K. Fairbank, while E. O. Reischauer wrote chapters 3-4 and part of 7, and A. M. Craig provided the major portion of chapter 7 and a part of chapter 10.

The authors show that in the early nineteenth century the Spanish and Dutch colonizers in dealing with China and Japan accepted and respected traditional Far Eastern civilization. The expansion of the West into the Far East during the second half of the nineteenth century created a new phenomenon—one totally different in character. Some countries or territories were taken over as colonies. China, treated as semi-colony, suffered the most. In reaction to China's suffering, Japan had no other alternative but westernization in order to survive and thus became the first non-Western expansionist country in the East. The impact of Western imperialism and Japanese expansionism weakened the traditional ruling class and produced a social imbalance throughout the area. The end of World War II then saw the rise of nationalism, the di-

vision of Korea, and the emergence of independent nations in Southeast Asia. The Communist movement benefited and flourished under the conditions the authors review for us here.

As in their first volume, *East Asia: The Great Tradition*, the authors, in this book, provide the best synthesis of high scholarship on the subject available. The bibliographical suggestions are thoughtful and comprehensive, providing a guide to American books on the history of the Far East. An ample number of illustrations, maps, tables, and charts have been included to aid the reader. Not only could this volume serve as a suitable textbook for a general course in Far East history, but more important, no interested student of Far Eastern history should ignore the worthwhile reading this book offers.

Yu San Wang
Dakota Wesleyan University

CHINA AND THE BOMB. BY MORTON H. HALPERIN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 161 pages and index, \$4.95.)

The detonation of an atomic device by Communist China has certainly raised many important questions for the West. In this compact book, Professor Halperin of Harvard University presents a sober analysis of Chinese nuclear strategy and potential, and of the alternatives available for American policy makers in the event of Chinese attainment of "modest nuclear capability" (possibly in the late 1960's or early 1970's) and "major capability." The author opposes the argument that the Chinese would indiscriminately use atomic weapons once they attain a certain level of capability. Rather, he still regards the

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Peking Statement On North Vietnam

On April 20, 1965, the standing committee of Communist China's National People's Congress passed a resolution urging full support of North Vietnam and calling for the use of Chinese troops in Vietnam if necessary. Excerpts from the text of the English translation, as issued by Hsinhua (the official press agency) follow:

The Chinese people have always resolutely supported the fraternal Vietnamese people in the joint struggle against the United States imperialist aggression. Now, in the name of the 650 million Chinese people, the standing committee of the National People's Congress solemnly declares that China will continue to do everything in its power to give resolute and unreserved support to the Vietnamese people in their patriotic and just struggle to resist the United States.

The present grave situation in Vietnam is entirely the handiwork of United States imperialism. The United States imperialists have torn the 1954 Geneva agreements on the Vietnam problem to shreds, launched a frenzied war of aggression against South Vietnam and engaged in repeated and wanton bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, thus flagrantly escalating the war. United States imperialism is the most ferocious enemy of the Vietnamese people and all the peace-loving people of the world.

Closely united and imbued with the revolutionary spirit of determination to fight and win, the entire people of Vietnam are today engaged in a fight of immense historical significance to liberate the South and defend the North, to defeat the United States aggressors and achieve complete national reunification.

The appeal to all the parliaments of the

world adopted by the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam solemnly reiterated the four-point proposition on the implementation of the Geneva agreements and the solution of the Vietnamese problem, namely:

1. To affirm the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people: independence, sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the United States Government must withdraw from South Vietnam its troops, military personnel, all types of arms, ammunition and war material, dismantle United States military bases in South Vietnam, disband the "military alliance" with South Vietnam and at the same time stop intervention in South Vietnam and aggression against it. The United States Government must cease all acts of war against North Vietnam and completely stop all invasion of the territory and violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

2. Before the peaceful unification of Vietnam is realized and while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two parts, all military terms of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be fully respected: For example, neither of the two parts of Vietnam is allowed to form any military alliance with any foreign country; no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel can be maintained in either part.

3: In accordance with the program of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, the affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves and no foreign intervention is allowed.

4. The realization of peaceful unification of Vietnam should be settled by the Vietnamese people of the two parts and no foreign intervention is allowed.

The standing committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China holds that this four-point proposition put forward by the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is wholly reasonable and that it is the only correct road to the solution of the Vietnamese problem. The Chinese Government and the Chinese people fully approve and firmly support this four-point proposition. . . .

China is a signatory to the 1954 Geneva agreements. China and Vietnam are fraternal Socialist neighbors, as interdependent as man's lips and teeth. The Chinese and Vietnamese peoples are close comrades in arms, sharing the same destiny. The Chinese Government and people have already solemnly declared that aggression by the United States imperialists against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam means aggression against China.

The Chinese people will absolutely not sit by idly without lending a helping hand. In accordance with the demands of the Vietnamese people and with the needs of the joint struggle against the United States imperialist aggression, the Chinese people have done and will continue to do their utmost to assist the Vietnamese people to defeat the United States aggressors completely. The Chinese people have always been infinitely loyal in fulfilling their proletarian internationalist obligations, they have never spared any sacrifice whatever in this respect, and they always mean what they say. Both past and present struggles testify to this.

The aggression which United States imperialism is committing against Vietnam is an important step in its counter-revolutionary global strategy. The Vietnamese people's heroic resistance to this aggression is an im-

portant part of the common struggle of the people of the whole world against United States imperialism and in defense of world peace. . . .

The standing committee of the National People's Congress calls on the people's organizations and the people throughout the country:

To heighten vigilance, strengthen national defense, take an active part in labor, increase production, study hard and work hard, and by actual deeds assist the Vietnamese people in their just and patriotic struggle of resistance to United States aggression;

To make full preparations to send their own people to fight together with the Vietnamese people and drive out the United States aggressors in the event that United States imperialism continues to escalate its war of aggression and the Vietnamese people need them.

The standing committee of the National People's Congress sincerely hopes that:

The people of the countries in the Socialist camp will give the Vietnamese people all-out support, oppose the United States aggressor and defend the southeastern out-post of the Socialist camp;

The people of all the countries of Indochina and South-east Asia will fully support the Vietnamese people, frustrate the criminal United States imperialist plan of escalating its war of aggression, and safeguard peace and security in Southeast Asia;

The people of the Asian, African and Latin American countries will give the Vietnamese people full support, deal blows at the United States imperialist forces of aggression and strive for still greater victories . . . ;

All countries and people throughout the world that oppose United States imperialism and love peace will warmly respond to the appeal of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, take emergency action and launch a mass movement of unprecedented force on a worldwide scale to compel the United States aggressors to get out of Vietnam, of Indochina and of the other places they occupy. . . .

LEADERSHIP AND SUCCESSION

(Continued from page 135)

clear provision for succession to the Party chairmanship, it seems likely that the Politburo (or perhaps only its Standing Committee), in consultation with a few of the most powerful nonmembers, will make the ultimate selection in behalf of the Central Committee. The latter, or possibly even a Party congress, might then be called into session to ratify the choice. The exact circumstances of Mao's departure—whether by sudden death or planned, phased withdrawal—will, of course, have an important bearing on the mechanics and smoothness of transition.

So, too, will the interplay of political forces between representatives of the three main institutions through which power is channeled in the Communist regime: the Party apparatus, the government, and the armed forces. (It remains unclear whether the public security forces constitute a primary and independent agency of power or come under the control of one or more of the three named above.)

'APRES [MAO] LE DELUGE'?

While C.C.P. history strongly suggests that the transition after Mao will be relatively peaceful and free of bloodletting, it cannot be assumed that the top leadership will maintain its traditional unity or that the second and third generation of leaders will continue to be either as submissive or militant as in the past. According to present indications, Liu Shao-ch'i will be the choice to succeed Mao as Party chairman. However, Liu is a pale and uninspiring replacement by any standard, and his age alone (over 65) would seem to preclude long tenure in office. If Liu proves unable to maintain the previous high degree of cohesion among the top leadership, as would seem likely, the task of preparing for his succession will become much more complicated.

In both the period immediately after Mao and the more chaotic time of selecting a suc-

cessor, two personalities seem destined to play a dominant role: Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Chou (age 68) is both a veteran Party leader (enjoying the longest continuous service of any Politburo member) and an unusually skilled and able governmental administrator. While he has long been a faithful executor of C.C.P. policies, however extreme, he appears to be more consistently flexible, realistic and pragmatic in outlook than Mao, Liu or others primarily identified with the Party apparatus. Among the prominent leaders apparently associated by service or political temperament with Chou are Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien, and economics planners Li Fu-ch'un and Po I-po.

In contrast to Chou, Teng Hsiao-p'ing (who is about 65) has had a relatively recent rise to high position within the C.C.P. hierarchy and his experience has been largely confined to the Party apparatus. As C.C.P. general secretary and the only member of both the Politburo Standing Committee and the Secretariat, Teng's power and authority approach that enjoyed by Chou. Tough-minded and ambitious but intelligent, Teng has evinced a preference for "hard line" solutions, a strongly nationalistic anti-Soviet zeal, and a crusading devotion to ideological orthodoxy. However, it should not be forgotten that, in contrast to Liu Shao-ch'i, he inveighed against "the cult of the individual" at the Eighth Party Congress (September, 1956). Among those who appear to share Teng's present ultraorthodox viewpoint (in addition to Liu) are Politburo member P'eng Chen and alternate K'ang Sheng.

It is often assumed that the problem of succession simply involves replacing Mao with another single, authoritative leader and that the process will falter only if a quarrel breaks out as to who shall be the *one*. On reflection, it is obvious that no individual can replace Mao. The next leader will be more dependent on the close cooperation of other leaders representing significant power constituencies (i.e., the bureaucracy, the military). The succession at the top will not be, except perhaps in name, an exchange of one

for one, but rather a replacement of the *one* with a small group of his present high-ranking lieutenants. The group leader, given the present choice of personalities and balance of political forces, will probably be little more than *primus inter pares*.

In a larger sense, however, the succession problem will be one of generations. Its resolution will affect not only the personalities and working style of the regime, but the whole future tone of the revolution.

CHINA AS A MILITARY POWER

(Continued from page 141)

until Peking can produce some form of credible nuclear deterrent of her own, it is logical to assume that she will not adopt policies that actually involve very high risks, even though her propaganda may sound extremely aggressive. The military doctrine of Mao Tse-tung is characterized by prudent aggressiveness.

In the foreseeable future, the C.P.R. cannot hope to match the increasing thermonuclear power of the United States or of the U.S.S.R., but this is probably not her short-term objective. If, in the next five years or so, the C.P.R. can develop an impressive stockpile of atomic weapons, a moderate supply of medium-range missiles and a proven capability to create hydrogen (fusion) bombs, her leaders may consider this to be temporarily sufficient. Their present concept of a deterrent against a possible nuclear attack may be the threat of retaliation against their neighbors—to use them as atomic hostages. They could also directly threaten the fringe lands of the Soviet Union.

That situation would permit Peking to increase pressure on her neighbors to reach an accommodation with her and to require the United States to withdraw from foreign bases in Asia. Peking may not engage in a great deal of overt nuclear blackmail. It is not really necessary and it is dangerous when the threatened state has the support of a great nuclear power. Still the very existence of

terrible atomic weapons in the hands of a determined nation constitutes a form of continuing atomic blackmail.

The possession of some nuclear capability will provide the C.P.R. with other possibilities. Her criticism of the "cowardice" of the Soviet Union indicates that Communist China may be more willing than the U.S.S.R. to employ atomic sabre rattling to support insurrections and "wars of liberation." Peking could also create a most serious form of intervention by offering atomic arms to the revolutionaries in a civil war or to one belligerent in a limited international war.

However, the fear that Peking might actually arm her Asian friends and allies with nuclear weapons does not appear to be justified. The C.P.R.'s hope is to dominate Asia, not to provide her neighbors with a deterrent against Chinese power. It is doubtful that Peking would be any more willing to arm her allies with atomic bombs than the Soviet Union has been to give nuclear weapons to China. Nonetheless, there is a valid and widespread worry that the C.P.R.'s atomic development program will encourage or force other nations to develop nuclear weapons. Further atomic proliferation would multiply the possibilities of nuclear war.

Finally, the possession of a limited atomic capability might make Communist China more willing to launch limited wars beyond her frontiers or to intervene with "volunteers" in revolutionary wars. The assumption would be that the fear of tactical retaliation would add another strong deterrent to the existing pressures against the use of nuclear weapons on her armed forces.

Although the Chinese Communists may continue to act with some caution, as well as with belligerence, the degree of caution that they will use in exploiting a growing nuclear capability will depend in large measure on the future credibility of the United States nuclear umbrella over the non-Communist states of Asia. Events of the late 1960's will test the courage of the free peoples of Asia, as well as the determination of the United States to support its defense commitments in that area.

FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

(Continued from page 154)

ciples. The peaceful settlement of the Indo-China struggle in July, 1954, for which Peking took a good deal of the credit, gave Communist China the spotlight at Bandung. Ten years later found the C.P.R. again involved over Vietnam, again on the verge of a major Afro-Asian conference (at Algiers, scheduled to begin in November 1965), and again currying favor with the nonaligned community by holding aloft basically the same set of principles proclaimed a decade earlier. Foreign aid, the new element, has added to Communist China's attractiveness in Africa and Asia. Indeed, in the 15 months from January, 1964 to March, 1965, China's loan and gift commitments have accounted for about 48 per cent of total foreign aid earmarked since the program began.

What meaning this major expansion has for Peking's involvement in Vietnam is certainly debatable. At Algiers the Chinese might be expected to seek a united front of Asian and African nations against United States policy in war. But 17 of the non-aligned nations have already pressed for a settlement under conditions contrary to those demanded by Peking and Hanoi.

The stage is therefore set for a test of Communist China's intentions, whether toward a dogmatic insistence upon revolutionary warfare or toward a flexibility that accepts the peaceful settlement of dangerous disputes. For it would seem that the success of China's aid program demands a certain accommodation by Peking to the changes in economic and political attitudes in the world today.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 176)

"Chinese bomb" as a political weapon and the Chinese threat one of political subversion, guerrilla warfare, and conventional military attacks.

Chong-Sik Lee
University of Pennsylvania

CHINA AND THE HELPING HAND, 1937-1945. BY ARTHUR N. YOUNG. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. 502 pages, \$10.00.)

Arthur Young served as financial adviser to China from 1929 to 1947 and, as such, played an important role in the formation of Chinese economic policy.

In this momentous book, he reviews the financial, economic, and international affairs of China in its most trying period. With sympathy, but also with admirable objectivity, he reviews what China did and did not do for herself and what other countries did and could have done for China during the more than eight years of war. Although he recognizes the failings of the Nationalist government and many other factors involved, Mr. Young is most emphatic in stressing that "Japan's leaders in 1937-1945, who chose the path of aggression, must bear the primary responsibility for China's downfall."

Not only the students of China, but everyone interested in the problems of underdeveloped countries would greatly benefit from reading this richly documented and well-written history and memoir.

C.S.L.

THE COMMUNISM OF MAO TSE-TUNG. BY ARTHUR A. COHEN. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964. 210 pages and index, \$5.00.)

In this useful and illuminating analysis of Mao's contributions to Marxist-Leninist thought, Arthur Cohen convincingly demonstrates that Mao has made certain novel "formulations on practical matters," but has not added much to the realm of theory and philosophy. The study, which is highly recommended for all students of comparative communism, discusses Mao's writings and policies on such questions as the making of a revolution, the role of the peasantry, the form of the State, the transition to communism, and the "People's Communes."

A.Z.R.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of July, 1965, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin

July 2—West German border guards refuse to allow 2 East German barges to enter West Germany. The refusal is in retaliation for East Germany's unilateral imposition of new regulations on barges using East German canals. West Germany maintains that the old regulations on interzonal barge traffic, agreed upon by the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, are still in effect.

July 4—The West German government allows 4 East German barges to proceed after their captains sign the old-style permits that had been agreed upon by the Four Powers.

Disarmament

July 27—In Geneva, the 17-nation Disarmament Committee of the U.N. resumes talks after a 10-month recess.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

July 1—The French government issues a statement, following a cabinet meeting, in reaction to the Common Market's failure to adopt a financial agreement for a joint agricultural market by June 30, 1965.

July 6—France "invites" its permanent representative to the E.E.C. to return to Paris. Because all major decisions of the E.E.C. must be approved by the 6 members, France's absence will block further action.

July 8—In Brussels, a French official attends a low-level E.E.C. committee meeting.

July 26—The Council of Ministers of the E.E.C. meets for 4 hours; the French foreign minister boycotts the meeting.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

July 23—The Kennedy round of tariff-reducing negotiations recesses; discussion will be resumed in September.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

July 21—The Council of the O.A.S. votes to postpone indefinitely the inter-American conference scheduled for August 4 because of the unsettled situation in the Dominican Republic. (See also *Dominican Republic*.)

Pacific Territories

July 14—In New Guinea, at a conference of representatives of 17 Pacific territories, the delegates vote to ask the South Pacific Commission (an agency run by Western countries to provide technical assistance) to permit greater Pacific islander participation on the commission.

United Nations

(See also *U. S. Government*)

July 5—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, in a statement before the U.N. Economic and Social Council, proposes that an international peace corps should be created, employing youths from all over the world.

July 8—The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development approves a final draft of a convention endorsing the principle that landlocked nations have the right of access to the sea.

July 9—U Thant confers with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London on the Vietnam situation.

July 26—The Security Council notes that the ceasefire in the Dominican Republic was broken on July 16 and 21; the Council de-

mands that the ceasefire still be observed.

July 28—In a letter from President Lyndon Johnson to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, delivered by U.S. Representative to the U.N. Arthur Goldberg, Johnson appeals to the U.N. and its individual members to try to effect a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

July 29—U Thant, replying to Johnson, promises to pursue efforts to bring peace to Vietnam.

July 30—U.S. Representative to the U.N. Arthur Goldberg, in a letter to the Security Council President, asks the Council for assistance in negotiating a Vietnam settlement but does not request a meeting.

World Peace Congress

July 12—At the world peace conference in Helsinki, Finland, the Soviet delegate walks out of a meeting where an Albanian speaker has castigated the Soviet Union.

ALGERIA

July 4—The Algerian Revolutionary Council asks Colonel Houari Boumedienne to form a new government.

July 5—On the third anniversary of Algeria's independence from France, Colonel Boumedienne delivers a radio address to the nation in which he discloses the membership of the 26-man Revolutionary Council. Boumedienne agrees to act as its president.

July 10—Boumedienne names a 20-man cabinet; he will serve as minister of defense and president.

BELGIUM

July 27—Pierre Harmel forms a new 15-man cabinet 2 months after the parliamentary election.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

Canada

July 6—Justice Minister Guy Favreau resigns. Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson names 7 new cabinet members.

Ceylon

July 3—It is reported that the U.S. will re-

sume economic aid to Ceylon; Ceylon has agreed to compensate 3 western companies for assets seized.

Ghana

July 20—A delegation of 8 Ghanaians departs from London for a trip to Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. It is reported that North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh invited the delegation to visit Hanoi.

Great Britain

July 8—It is reported that Harold Davies, parliamentary secretary at the Ministry of Pensions, is en route to Hanoi to try to persuade North Vietnam's leaders to hold talks with a Commonwealth peace mission. (See also *North Vietnam*.) In the House of Commons, Conservative opponents criticize the dispatch of Davies.

July 15—The House of Commons approves the finance bill on its 3rd reading by a vote of 291-285. The bill provides for a long-term capital gains tax and a single corporation tax.

July 22—The leader of the Conservative party and of the Opposition in Parliament, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, resigns.

July 27—Austerity measures, including a slowdown in public spending and tightening of credit buying, are introduced; the purpose is to prevent economic inflation and the devaluation of the pound sterling.

July 28—On the second and final ballot, Edward Heath is chosen parliamentary leader of the Conservative Opposition.

India

(See also *Yugoslavia*)

July 8—Under a ceasefire agreement, Indian and Pakistani troops complete their withdrawal from the Rann of Cutch, where fighting broke out in April.

July 13—An Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman announces that the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan will meet next month to negotiate a settlement of the Rann of Cutch border dispute.

India announces that she has granted diplomatic recognition to the 13-member Arab League.

Maldiv Islands

July 26—The British government grants complete independence to the Maldiv Islands.

Pakistan

July 13—Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto discloses that the U.S. will not be able to commit new aid funds to Pakistan until September, because of congressional delays on foreign aid legislation.

July 14—President Mohammad Ayub Khan criticizes the U.S. delay in giving aid to Pakistan, stating that "Pakistan is seeking friends and not masters."

BRITISH TERRITORIES; THE

Basutoland

July 2—Chief Leabua Jonathan wins a specially arranged by-election. According to the South African Press Association, Chief Leabua will now take over the prime ministership.

CHILE

July 24—President Eduardo Frei Montalva returns from a 3-week trip to Italy, France, Britain and West Germany.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

July 9—*The New York Times* reports that *Hsinhua* (Chinese Communist press agency) has published a plea to the Chinese population in South Vietnam to support the Vietcong (pro-Communist) rebels.

July 12—*Hsinhua* charges that U.S. planes "intruded" into Chinese air space after an attack on a North Vietnam border town.

July 20—General Li Tsung-jen, a vice-president and later acting president of Nationalist China, returns to the mainland after 16 years of exile in the U.S. He announces his support of the Communist government.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

July 8—President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Moise Tshombe confer today on Kasavubu's decision that Interior Minister

Godefroid Munongo must resign; he is also the newly elected Governor of East Katanga.

July 16—A communiqué discloses that Premier Tshombe will assume the posts of interior minister and minister of civil service administration to avoid a clash with Kasavubu over filling the vacancies created by the removal of Munongo.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

July 2—It is reported that in a speech last night Brigadier General Antonio Imber Barreras, leader of the ruling civilian-military junta, declared that he would step down in favor of a provisional government.

July 10—*The New York Times* reports that in negotiations on a provisional government, Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó leader of the rebels, has given his support to the O.A.S.-sponsored candidate, Hector Garcia Goday (former diplomat and industrialist), to head the new government. General Imbert has conditionally given his approval.

July 20—At the U.N., representatives of the junta and of the rebel faction urge the withdrawal of the inter-American peace force, primarily U.S. troops, from the Dominican Republic.

July 21—The O.A.S. mediation team resumes talks with the 2 rival factions on a provisional government.

ECUADOR

July 9—In Guayaquil, some 21,000 demonstrators are stopped by police using tear gas and gunfire.

July 10—The ruling military junta arrests many political leaders in Guayaquil and Quito, following disturbances.

July 11—The junta announces that political leaders responsible for the recent demonstrations for a return to civilian rule will be deported.

July 13—It is reported that an outbreak in Guayaquil last night resulted in 2 students' deaths; 11 persons were wounded.

July 14—Martial law is proclaimed in Guayaquil.

July 15—The junta announces that it will confer with political leaders on calling elections.

July 17—The 9-man cabinet resigns; it is reported that the junta will appoint new ministers more acceptable to the junta's foes.

July 28—The military junta appoints a coalition civilian cabinet.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, E.E.C.*)

July 3—Indonesian President Sukarno confers in Paris with President Charles de Gaulle.

July 12—In the annual report of the French Atomic Energy Commission, made public today, it is disclosed that a "new nuclear explosive device" has been put into production.

July 19—The French government protests to the U.S. over an intrusion by an American photoreconnaissance jet plane, charging that it flew over a forbidden zone. The plane flew over and photographed a French nuclear-production complex. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy.*)

In a statement by Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the government rejects a U.S. proposal for a conference on reforming the international monetary system.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

(See also *Intl, Berlin*)

July 8—It is reported that in June, Professor Wolfgang Pilz, leader of a team of West German scientists helping the U.A.R. in rocket development, secretly left Egypt.

GREECE

July 12—The Greek cabinet decides to remove Defense Minister Peter Garoufalios, who has opposed Premier George Papandreou's plan to purge the army of right-wing officers.

July 15—Papandreou resigns after King Constantine refuses to appoint him as defense minister. The King appoints George Athanasiadis-Novas, president of parlia-

ment, as the new premier. The new government is sworn in.

July 16—In Athens, supporters of Papandreou demonstrate and fight with police for several hours.

July 30—An emergency meeting of parliament, to consider approval of the Athanasiadis-Novas government, becomes unruly. The acting parliamentary president declares that Premier Athanasiadis-Novas' cabinet has fallen and that parliament is adjourned.

July 31—Premier Athanasiadis-Novas' government declares that it still is the "constitutional and lawful" government.

IRAQ

July 4—It is reported that 5 Iraqi cabinet ministers have resigned and that several army officers have been dismissed. The upheaval is a result of a conflict between President Abdel Salam Arif and pro-Nasserites.

July 12—It is reported that President Arif reshuffled his cabinet yesterday, replacing 6 pro-Nasser ministers.

ISRAEL

July 23—The secretariat of the Mapai party endorses the Central Committee's decision to expel ex-Premier David Ben-Gurion and 6 other party members who joined him in forming a new party faction.

JAPAN

July 4—National and local elections are held for half of the 250 members in the House of Councilors (upper house of parliament).

July 6—Complete unofficial returns from all 127 constituencies, except 2 which vote next Sunday, disclose that the Liberal-Democratic party of Premier Eisaku Sato won 70 seats, giving them a total of 139 seats in the 250-member upper house.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF

July 14—During a special 30-day session of parliament to consider ratification of a treaty normalizing Korean-Japanese relations, members of the government and opposition parties engage in fistfighting in the National Assembly.

July 19—Syngman Rhee, first president of the Republic of Korea, dies in exile at 90.
 July 21—It is reported that the National Assembly has postponed consideration of the Japanese-Korean treaty.

LAOS

July 18—Elections for the 59-member National Assembly are held. Members will be elected from a list of 200.
 July 20—Election returns disclose that the moderate Youth party has become the strongest party in parliament.

LEBANON

July 20—Premier Hussein Oweini's cabinet resigns.
 July 25—Former Premier Rashid Karame forms a new cabinet.

PERU

July 5—President Fernando Belaunde Terry's government suspends constitutional guarantees for 30 days in a purge against Communists and extremists. Some 250 persons are arrested.

PORTUGAL

July 25—The National Electoral College reelects Americo Deus Rodrigues Tomas as president.

RUMANIA

July 19—At the opening of the ninth party congress, Communist party secretary Nicolae Ceausescu announces that the Rumanian Workers party will henceforth be known as the Rumanian Communist party.
 July 24—At the closing session of the congress, Ceausescu discloses organizational changes. The 9-member Politburo is replaced by a 7-man Permanent Presidium.

SUDAN, THE

July 12—It is reported by the official Sudanese radio that rebels in the southern Sudan have attacked the government-held city of Juba.
 July 18—There is a report that the government has imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew

in the 3 southern provinces where rebels have pressed for autonomy from the north.

TURKEY

July 30—The Turkish government requests a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to hear Turkey's charges that the Cypriote government, by amending the electoral laws unconstitutionally, has violated Turkish Cypriote rights.

U.S.S.R., THE

July 1—President Tito of Yugoslavia ends a 13-day visit to the Soviet Union. A joint communiqué urges that the U.N. Security Council be enlarged to include more African-Asian representatives.
 July 3—In a speech to graduates of Soviet military academies, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist party, Leonid I. Brezhnev, warns the West that its intelligence services have underestimated Soviet "nuclear missile power."
 July 16—Tass, official Soviet press agency, reports that a new unmanned Soviet satellite, Proton 1, has been successfully launched by a new booster rocket. It is the heaviest payload to have been put into orbit by any nation, weighing 26,000 pounds.
 July 17—In a speech in Riga, capital of Latvia, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin warns that "every new aggressive act in Vietnam undertaken by the Americans . . . inevitably will be followed by an appropriate rebuff from the Communist camp."
 July 22—Gerald Brooke, a British language teacher, who entered the Soviet Union as a tourist in April, is tried in Moscow on charges of engaging in subversive activities.
 July 23—Gerald Brooke is sentenced to 1 year in prison and 4 years in a labor camp by a Soviet court.
 July 25—It is reported that 3 U.S. rabbis, at Sabbath services yesterday, addressed worshippers in Moscow's Central Synagogue for the first time in 10 years.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Yemen* and *Yugoslavia*)

UNITED STATES, THE Civil Rights

July 1—In Jackson, Mississippi, civil rights demonstrators march before the state capitol. A court order yesterday enjoined police from arresting the marchers; over 1,000 demonstrators have been arrested recently.

July 3—At the 56th annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Executive Director Roy Wilkins declares that the N.A.A.C.P. should help the U.S. government "to enforce all the civil rights laws."

July 4—The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), at its 21st annual convention, votes to wage an antisegregation campaign in Bogalusa, Louisiana.

July 7—Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., announces that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference has chosen Chicago as the first northern city in which to stage an integration drive.

July 8—A Negro, attacked during a civil rights demonstration in Bogalusa, shoots a white man. Police Chief Claxton Knight reports that the Negro is believed to belong to the Deacons for Defense and Justice (an armed Negro organization).

July 10—James Farmer, National Director of CORE, arrives in Bogalusa. Federal District Judge Herbert Christenberry of New Orleans refuses to grant an injunction against civil rights demonstrations; Christenberry issues an order enjoining Bogalusa police from interfering with Negroes' civil rights. He also orders police to protect the demonstrators from harassment.

July 11—Some 500 white segregationists demonstrate against integration in Bogalusa. Later, James Farmer leads a civil rights demonstration along the same route. Some 325 state troopers guard the marchers.

July 13—Negro leaders reject a request by Governor John J. McKeithen of Louisiana that they call off demonstrations in Bogalusa for 30 days.

July 15—President Lyndon B. Johnson orders

John Doar, chief of the Civil Rights Division within the Justice Department, to Bogalusa after Mayor Jesse H. Cutrer, Jr., and civil rights groups request federal assistance.

The N.A.A.C.P. files complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, charging 10 employers and 5 labor unions with racial discrimination; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting discrimination in employment, became effective July 2, 1965.

July 16—A Negro, Willie Brewster, is shot and seriously wounded while driving along an Alabama road; a companion charges that the shots were fired by white men.

July 18—Willie Brewster dies.

July 19—Federal Judge Christenberry orders the 2 chief police officials in Bogalusa to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for failing to obey an injunction ordering them to protect civil rights demonstrators from harassment. The Bogalusa officials appeal by radio to the townspeople to save them from criminal prosecution "by ignoring the parades and pickets."

July 24—In Chicago, Dr. Martin Luther King opens his civil rights campaign in the north.

July 26—King leads a march on Chicago's city hall.

Economy

July 1—The U.S. Treasury's gold stock has fallen to \$13.9 billion, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Gold stock is at the lowest point since the week ending October 12, 1938.

July 12—The Labor Department reports that factory employment in June rose to more than 18 million persons and that factory wages reached a new high, averaging \$108.21 weekly.

Foreign Policy

July 3—The White House announces that a committee has been created under former Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon to study the problem of providing enough international monetary liquidity and credit to

finance a continuing growth in world trade.
 July 5—The White House announces that a U.S. mission to Moscow and other Communist bloc capitals, to discuss expanding East-West trade, is being considered.

July 9—At a news conference, President Johnson declares that the situation in Vietnam will "get worse before it gets better." He announces that the 60,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam will soon be increased to 75,000 and, if necessary, even more.

July 10—Treasury Secretary Henry H. Fowler, in a speech before the Virginia State Bar Association, proposes a world monetary conference to consider "improved international monetary arrangements," particularly with regard to maintaining world financial reserves (or international liquidity). Fowler announces that President Johnson has authorized the proposal.

The White House announces that President Johnson has asked Eugene R. Black, consultant on economic development in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, to visit various European countries to discuss the possibility of creating an Asian development bank. Black will meet with members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) The White House discloses that Black gave an encouraging report on his recent trip to Asia to promote the Asian bank project.

July 11—In a television interview, Secretary of State Dean Rusk warns that all of North Vietnam is subject to U.S. attack as long as North Vietnamese continue to fight in the South.

July 12—The U.S. and Japan open their 4th annual intercabinet meeting; the conferees will try to resolve trade problems and consider a billion dollar Asian development bank.

The White House discloses that a report prepared by Livingston Merchant for the U.S. and A.D.P. Heeney for Canada urges more consultation as the basis for closer U.S.-Canadian relations. (See also *U.S. Government*, July 5.)

July 15—In Moscow, U.S. Ambassador-at-

large W. Averell Harriman confers for over 3 hours with Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin.

July 21—Harriman confers with Kosygin for the second time.

Six hours after Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara returns from Vietnam President Johnson begins consultations with foreign policy and national security officials. Press Secretary Bill Moyers describes the talks "as a thorough and penetrating review of the many facets of the situation in South Vietnam." (See also *Vietnam*.)

July 22—Harriman arrives in West Germany for talks with Bonn leaders.

The State Department press officer Robert J. McCloskey, declares that the U.S. has apologized to France for an intrusion over French air space. (See also *France*.)

July 27—The U.S. Defense Department announces that U.S. jet fighter planes attacked and destroyed 1 antiaircraft missile site and damaged another 40 miles from Hanoi. The Defense Department confirms that on July 24 a U.S. jet was shot down by a land-to-air missile. Six U.S. planes are lost. (See also *Vietnam*.)

July 28—In a televised news conference President Johnson announces that 50,000 more servicemen will be sent to Vietnam, raising U.S. troop strength there to 125,000. The monthly draft is to be increased from 17,000 to 35,000 men in order to meet this commitment in South Vietnam. Reservists will not be called at this time. (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Government

July 1—The White House announces that the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Thomas K. Finletter, has resigned. The Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Harlan Cleveland, is named to the post.

At the swearing-in ceremony of Air Force General William F. McKee as administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, President Johnson announces that he will accelerate the supersonic airliner program.

July 2—President Johnson addresses the National Education Association; he declares that he will propose a National Teachers Corps to work with teachers in slum and poor rural areas.

Luci Baines Johnson is baptized into the Roman Catholic Church on her 18th birthday.

July 5—The White House announces that Livingston T. Merchant, formerly Under Secretary of State, will be nominated to serve as U.S. executive director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; he succeeds John C. Bullitt.

July 6—The Senate completes congressional action on a constitutional amendment to provide for presidential disability and succession and vice-presidential vacancies; it is sent to the states for ratification.

The Treasury's final cash statement for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, discloses that total cash receipts rose \$4 billion over the previous year. The Treasury closes the year with \$11.5 billion in the bank.

July 7—The Delaware River Basin Commission (composed of the governors of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware and Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall) declares a 4-state water emergency.

July 8—George Reedy, President Johnson's press secretary, begins an indefinite leave of absence to undergo treatment for a foot ailment. A special assistant to the President, Bill D. Moyers, is named acting press secretary.

President Johnson names Henry Cabot Lodge as ambassador to South Vietnam; he succeeds Maxwell D. Taylor, who had agreed to serve for only 1 year. Lodge will assume his new duties in mid-August.

President Johnson announces 6 new ambassadorial appointments, including that of Hugh M. Smythe, a Negro, as ambassador to Syria.

July 9—Vice-President Hubert Humphrey announces the 6 members of a bipartisan Select Committee on Standards and Conduct to oversee the ethical behavior of Senate members, officers and employees.

The committee was authorized almost one year ago.

July 10—President Johnson announces that the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, Carl Rowan, is resigning. He also declares that Air Force Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert will resign Sept. 30; he will be replaced by Dr. Harold Brown. Major General Chester V. Clifton will resign as Johnson's military aide; his successor will be Major James U. Cross.

July 11—In a report to President Johnson made public today on the progress made in the year since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, it is learned that the letter of the law is being followed; "the next step is to achieve compliance in spirit." The report was prepared by the departments of Justice, Commerce and Health, Education and Welfare.

Johnson appoints Negro lawyer William Benson Bryant to serve as a U.S. district judge and Negro Major Hugh Robinson to his personal staff of White House military aides.

July 12—Testifying before a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach defends the nomination of ex-Governor James P. Coleman of Mississippi to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Coleman has been accused of being a segregationist.

July 13—Internal Revenue Commissioner Sheldon Cohen and Attorney General Katzenbach testify before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure; they admit that federal agents have used illegal wiretapping and other procedures in investigating tax fraud cases in the federal government's drive against organized crime.

Judge Thurgood Marshall is appointed U.S. Solicitor General by President Johnson. He will succeed Archibald Cox.

President Johnson tells a news conference that he will press a drive to eradicate the social and economic problems facing Negroes.

Johnson announces that he has named Attorney Leonard H. Marks to serve as

director of the U.S.I.A. Marks has represented the Johnson family's radio-television station in Austin, Texas.

July 14—President Johnson orders Interior Secretary Stewart Udall to convene the Ad Hoc Water Resources Council to study the water problems of the Middle Atlantic and New England states.

President Johnson signs the Older Americans Act of 1965; this federal program allocates money to states and to public and private nonprofit organizations to provide programs for the aged and to train personnel to teach them new skills.

Adlai E. Stevenson, the U.S. Representative to the U.N., dies of a heart attack in London. Stevenson was the Democratic presidential nominee in 1952 and 1956.

July 15—Press Secretary Bill Moyers announces that Johnson has prohibited wire-tapping by federal employees except in national security cases.

Johnson signs a bill to halt illicit sales of stimulant and depressant pills.

July 17—President Johnson sends Congress a Teaching Professions Act of 1965 to train teachers and to upgrade teaching in poor areas.

July 20—President Johnson names Associate Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg as the U.S. Representative to the U.N., succeeding the late Adlai Stevenson.

The White House conference on education, attended by 700 persons, opens.

July 21—President Johnson tells the delegates attending the education conference that he plans to create a series of Adlai E. Stevenson Fellowships enabling young people all over the world to intern in U.N. agencies. Johnson receives an oral report on the conclusions reached by the conference.

July 23—President Johnson signs a coinage bill providing for new "silverless" dimes and quarters; silver in half dollars will drop from 90 to 40 per cent.

The Senate confirms Arthur Goldberg as the U.S. Representative to the U.N.

A federal judge fines 8 major steel companies \$50,000 each for conspiring to fix

prices in the carbon sheet steel industry in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

July 24—President Johnson names Joseph A. Califano, Jr., a special assistant to the president.

July 26—The White House announces that President Johnson has created a 19-man national commission to study crime.

The Senate confirms the appointment of James P. Coleman to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

President Johnson nominates Representative Oren Harris of Arkansas to serve as district judge for the Eastern and Western districts of Arkansas.

New Jersey Governor Richard J. Hughes announces that the governors of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania have formed a Mid-Atlantic Governors' Conference to handle mutual problems, including water conservation.

July 27—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Anthony Celebrezze resigns to accept a federal judgeship. Johnson names John W. Gardner, head of the Carnegie Corporation, to the post.

The 57th annual National Governors' Conference convenes in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The governors urge nationwide cooperation to improve U.S. education.

President Johnson signs a bill requiring all cigarette containers to carry a printed warning that smoking may endanger health.

The House completes congressional action on a bill providing federal aid for housing, including a rent subsidies program.

July 28—President Johnson names Abe Fortas, a Washington lawyer, to the Supreme Court.

Johnson appoints N.B.C. correspondent John W. Chancellor as director of the Voice of America. He succeeds Henry Loomis.

The Senate completes congressional action on the Medicare-Social Security bill providing medical care for citizens over 65 financed through increased Social Security taxes; an average 7 per cent increase in some Social Security benefits retroactive to January 1 is included.

July 30—At the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, with former President Harry Truman (who first urged such legislation) looking on, Johnson signs the Medicare-Social Security bill.

Labor

July 2—The National Labor Relations Board orders a manufacturer, who moved his operations to Florida, to bargain with the union he left behind in New York, even though the union cannot prove it represents a majority of the workers in the Florida shop.

July 27—Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz confers with representatives of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and the American Merchant Marine Institute in an effort to mediate the 42-day-old maritime strike.

Military

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*)

July 14—After traveling in space 228 days, Mariner 4 passes close to Mars to take pictures of its surface.

July 15—Mariner 4 transmits the first close-up pictures of Mars to earth.

Politics

July 18—Denison Kitchel, the director of former Arizona Republican Senator Barry Goldwater's unsuccessful presidential campaign in 1964, admits that he did join the John Birch Society in 1960, but resigned after about 2 weeks. Kitchel is president of the Free Society Association formed by Goldwater.

July 25—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller (Republican) announces that he will not seek his party's presidential nomination in 1968. He will seek a 3rd gubernatorial term in 1966.

Segregation

(See *U.S. Civil Rights*)

Supreme Court

(See *U.S. Government*)

VIETNAM, NORTH

July 1—The official North Vietnamese press agency broadcasts an announcement that the government has rejected the Commonwealth peace mission.

July 15—It is reported that President Ho Chi Minh has asked Ghana President Nkrumah to visit. (See *British Commonwealth, Ghana*.)

VIETNAM, SOUTH

(See also *U.S.S.R., U.S. Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia*)

July 1—Vietcong (pro-Communist) guerrillas early today stage an attack on the Da-nang air base; 1 U.S. airman is killed. It is estimated that there is \$5 million in damages.

July 2—U. S. Navy planes bomb an oil storage area 40 miles southeast of Hanoi, capital of North Vietnam.

July 5—U.S. B-52 bomber planes, based on Guam, attack an area 35 miles northeast of Saigon in what is known as Zone D. The attack is staged against a suspected Vietcong rebel communications and troop mobilization area.

July 7—An article in the Soviet Communist party newspaper, *Pravda*, supports the North Vietnamese 4-point proposal for ending the Vietnamese war and calls on the U.S. to consider the plan seriously. This plan includes an end to bombing and withdrawal of foreign troops from South Vietnam, a return to the 1954 Geneva accord, settlement in South Vietnam with the National Liberation Front, and reunification without foreign interference.

U.S. B-52 bomber planes on Guam strike a Vietcong troop area in Zone D. It is reported that yesterday a combined South Vietnamese, U.S. and Australian task force of 2,500 men combed Zone D but could find no Vietcong rebels.

It is disclosed that late last night Vietcong rebels attacked a 28-boat convoy.

July 8—Some 8,000 newly arrived U.S. marines are based at Danang and Quinhon; they bring U.S. forces in South Vietnam to over 60,000 men.

July 9—Vietcong guerrillas attack a U.S. Navy base at Chulai; 5 U.S. servicemen are killed and 11 are wounded.

It is disclosed that U.S. paratroop forces reported yesterday that they had wounded over 100 Vietcong rebels in an allied drive in Zone D.

July 10—A U.S. spokesman reports that U.S. Air Force jets, providing cover for a bombing attack against North Vietnam, brought down 2 Communist MIG fighter planes.

July 12—U.S. jet planes attack a rail and ordnance yard in North Vietnam. U.S. planes drop leaflets appealing for an end to the war over 3 North Vietnamese cities.

July 15—U.S. planes yesterday attacked a "point farther north of Hanoi than any other target previously hit by U.S. aircraft," according to a U.S. spokesman. It is disclosed that U.S. planes have also hit a target 40 miles from the Chinese-North Vietnamese frontier.

July 16—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Henry Cabot Lodge, newly reappointed ambassador to South Vietnam, arrive in Vietnam.

The U.S. military command confirms that a North Vietnam army regiment is in South Vietnam.

July 17—*Hsinhua* (Chinese Communist press agency) reports that China and North Vietnam have signed an agreement whereby China will furnish "economic and technical assistance" to North Vietnam.

The U.S. Embassy's public affairs officer discloses that the U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam has recommended a large increase in American combat troops.

July 19—Vietnamese forces, after engineers have repaired the damaged bridges, reopen Route 19 in the Central Highlands. It is reported that the Vietcong have destroyed 7 more bridges along Route 15 in the last 3 days.

Vietcong troops fire on the Bienhoa airbase.

July 20—It is reported that a mine, planted by Vietcong rebels, would have very likely

killed U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor if undiscovered.

McNamara leaves for the U.S. He declares that the "over-all situation" in South Vietnam "continues to be serious." "In many aspects it has deteriorated since 15 months ago, when I was last here."

July 24—U.S. bombers attack a North Vietnamese explosives factory.

Six religious groups—Roman Catholics, Protestants, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Bahai and the General Buddhist Association—form a joint religious council.

July 25—A U.S. spokesman in Saigon declares that the U.S. jet fighter that was downed near Hanoi yesterday may have been hit by a ground-to-air missile.

YEMEN

July 1—Premier Ahmed Mohammed Noman and his cabinet resign. It is reported that Noman resigned over President Abdullah al-Salal's decision to create a supreme armed forces council.

July 22—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser announces a plan to withdraw Egyptian troops from Yemen within 6 months if an end to the civil war can be agreed on. He discloses that peace talks with Saudi Arabia have been resumed.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

July 28—President Tito, in Belgrade, confers separately with Prime Minister Shastri of India and U.S. Ambassador-at-large Hariman on the Vietnam conflict.

July 31—In a joint communiqué, Tito and Shastri declare that they will pursue efforts for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam with other nonaligned nations. *The New York Times* reports that "an authoritative source" has disclosed that Tito will ask U.A.R. President Nasser to visit North Vietnam and Communist China to discuss ending the war in Vietnam.

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